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The better AI gets, the smaller its share of the economy might get – Alex Imas and Phil Trammell

Dwarkesh PatelJune 4, 20261h 16m
Topics46
Introduction and Core Questions0:00Scarcity and the Relational Sector0:34Labor Share and Predictive Challenges2:00Historical Context: David Ricardo and Automation3:03The Value of Economic Models Over Forecasts5:01Labor Share and Capital Share Definitions6:01Complements and Network-Adjusted Factor Shares8:02Sectoral Implications and Satiation9:31Task-Based Model and Relational Value10:06Increasing Variety and Capital Demand11:32Moore's Law and the Value of Compute14:01Intrinsic Preferences for Human Connection16:33Jane Street's Training Model18:33The "Messy Middle" Scenario19:31Political Economy and Transition Dynamics21:04Conditions Required for the Messy Middle25:02Redistribution Mechanisms: Complexity and Timeline26:04Universal Basic Capital and Targeting Challenges27:32Wealth Tax Political Sustainability28:03Optimal Taxation Approaches29:03Evidence on White-Collar Automation30:06Coordination Effects and Layoff Narratives31:30O-Ring Theory and Task Complementarity32:02Jevons Paradox and Demand Elasticity33:34Citrini Recession Scenario35:01Gemini Omni and Multimodal Models38:31O-Ring Automation and Reliability Requirements39:30Gans and Goldfarb Automation Model40:30Political and Licensing Frictions42:30AI Preferences and Evolutionary Dynamics43:02Wealth, Capital, and Savings Behavior46:32Returns to Capital and General Equilibrium49:31Interest Rates and Investment-Specific Technical Change52:50Increasing Varieties and Capital Demand53:34Wealth Accumulation Preferences and Dissipation55:04Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Reasons for Accumulation56:34Von Neumann Probes and Accounting Questions59:02RL Credit Assignment and Cursor Composer 2.51:00:34Policy Advice for Countries Outside the AI Supply Chain1:01:33The Messy Middle and High Interest Rates1:03:00Difficulties of Indexing the Economy1:04:33Electricity vs. Social Media Analogy1:06:34Open Models, Runaway Gains, and Recursive Improvement1:08:34Retraining vs. Indexing Strategies1:09:35Feasibility of Indexing and Privatization Trends1:11:30Commoditization, Safety, and Political Economy1:13:00
In a Nutshell

As AI automates non-relational production, labor share could collapse toward zero if demand for new capital varieties outpaces saturation in human-intrinsic services like empathy and performance. Historical stability of the ~60% labor share may not persist once entire supply chains become fully automated, and redistribution via negative income taxes or broad capital indexing faces targeting, political, and timing challenges. Developing countries benefit more from early indexing into AI-driven assets than from domestic retraining, while gradual displacement creates a politically fragile "messy middle" even if aggregate wealth eventually expands.

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Alex Imas is Director of AGI Economics at Google DeepMind and Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. Phil Trammell is Head of Economics at Epoch and research scholar at Stanford. The discussion focuses on what economics predicts about wages, labor share, taxation and redistribution of AGI-generated wealth, and what will remain scarce in a highly automated world.

Scarcity determines where value accrues. The relational sector includes services and goods where human involvement is intrinsically part of the value. Even if automation eliminates scarcity elsewhere, scarcity persists in activities requiring human participation. In a world where AI and robotics handle all physical production, humans would have no reason to participate in the machine economy. However, humans may still value human involvement in services like performances or cafe experiences. This creates a human economy where humans provide services to each other, though some wealth flows out to purchase automated goods from the machine economy.

The human economy is not a closed loop. Machines do not demand human services, so the human-only economy's share may shrink. Individual economic forecasts are unreliable. A blog post by Andrey Fradkin, Brian Jabarian, and Andrew Koh found substantial disagreement among economists' labor market predictions. Prediction markets may better aggregate forecasts and capture crowd wisdom. Economic forecasting has historically been poor.

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