Sarah Paine – Why Russia Lost the Cold War
These notes were generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies.
Since we seem to be in a second Cold War, revisit the last one to see why it turned out the way it did and why the participants thought it turned out the way it did. Pose the question: why did Russia lose the Cold War? People have loads of different answers. This is a tour of the counter-arguments. Start with an answer many Americans have: "Ronald Reagan single-handedly defeated the Soviet Union." Then give counter-arguments: other external explanations of what others did to the Soviet Union, internal ones of what the Soviet Union did poorly, and umbrella explanations.
Picture at the Reagan Ranch after the Cold War: Gorbachevs and Reagans having a grand old time, suggesting something off with that explanation. "Ronald Reagan did it" school: massive military buildup bankrupted the Soviet Union. Man of words and deeds with memorable speeches.
"The regimes planted by totalitarianism have had more than 30 years to establish their legitimacy, but none—not one regime—has yet been able to risk free elections. Regimes planted by bayonets do not take root." (Reagan before Parliament)
"General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization, come to this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate. Tear down this wall!" (Reagan before Brandenburg Gate in Berlin)
"Evil Empire" speech to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida.
Significant military buildup started under Carter after Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Invested in and deployed missiles in Europe. Funded anti-communist insurgencies worldwide. More aggressive military patrolling. By end of office, half a dozen ships short of 600-ship navy. Tried to build Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) missile shield.
Soviets tried to match. Combined GNPs of US, NATO allies, Japan: 7 times larger than Soviet GNP. Need asymmetric strategy. CIA thought Russia spent up to 20% of GNP on defense during Cold War; post-Cold War accurate stats: at least 40-50%, up to 70% including military infrastructure. US spent <8%, Germany <6%, Japan <2%, Nazi Germany 55%.
Quote former Soviet ambassador to West Germany Valentin Falin: > "Following the American strategy of our exhaustion in the arms race, our crisis in public health and all the things that have to do with standard of living reached a new dimension."
US arms race plus arms race with China plunged Soviet economy into permanent crisis. Georgy Arbatov (Soviet expert on US): on Afghan war, > "It is quite clear that the Afghan war was most advantageous for the United States. And we got our Vietnam."
Gorbachev to Politburo one year after power: > "Look, the Americans are betting precisely on the fact that the Soviet Union is scared of this SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative, a missile defense. That's why they're putting pressure on us, to exhaust us."
Some argue US victory in arms race guaranteed Cold War victory.
After WWII, Soviets wanted conference of European states to confirm expanded WWII borders. Western Europeans insisted on human rights provisions. Helsinki Accords included human rights. Dissidents in Eastern Bloc and activists in West held communists accountable, contrasting communism's promises vs. dictatorship.
Robert Gates (former CIA director, Defense head): > "The Soviets desperately wanted this big conference and it laid the foundations for the end of their empire. We resisted it for years only to discover years later that this conference had yielded benefits beyond our wildest imagination."
Jimmy Carter's human rights initiative. Gorbachev's English translator: Carter's emphasis on denied human rights resonated, made people want democratic, open, liberal society.
Carter at Notre Dame: "We have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy. What draws us Americans together is a belief in human freedom. We want the world to know that our nation stands for more than just financial prosperity. We're bigger than that."
Eduard Shevardnadze (Gorbachev's foreign minister): > "Look, the belief that we are a great country is deeply ingrained in me, but great in what? Territory? Population, quantity of arms, people's troubles, the individual's lack of rights? And what do we, who have virtually the highest infant mortality rate in the world, take pride in? It's not easy answering the questions. Who are you? Who do you wish to be? A country which is feared or a country which is respected? A country of power or a country of kindness."
Vitaly Ignatenko (Russian journalist): communism essential to Soviet survival but undemocratic ideology that can't endure.
Oleg Grinevsky (Soviet diplomat): > "Look, communist ideology is associated above all with the Soviet Union. Its rejection created a vacuum and it determined its ultimate fate."
Boris Yeltsin: > "Look, no one wants a new Soviet Union."
Counter-argument: Helsinki human rights clauses and Carter's campaign destroyed communist belief.
Richard Nixon played China card so US and China ganged up on Soviet Union, overextending it financially and wrecking it militarily. Chinese say Mao played America card. In 1969, China-Soviet border war. China got nuclear bomb in 1964, no longer deferred to Soviets, tough on border.
Soviets asked US if okay to nuke China; US said no. Chinese realized Soviets (wanting to nuke them) primary adversary, not US. US cozied up to China. Chinese belligerency forced Soviets to militarize long border with China (nuclear-armed mechanized forces, expensive). Like US having such borders with Canada/Mexico—bankrupting, and US richer than Soviets.
Nixon plays China card, others leverage. Ford dabbles in human rights, Carter goes for it and starts military buildup, Reagan amplifies. Reagan deals from ideological/military strength. US foreign policy consistent at strategic level: free trade, democracy, containment of communism—both parties.
Forget great man theory. Nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed submarines key. Deterrence theory: reliable second-strike capability deters first strike.
Carter (Annapolis grad, submariner) began aggressive fleet deployment, continued under Reagan: targeting Soviet subs in home waters. Soviets feared US could destroy their second-strike on first strike.
Valery Boldin (Gorbachev aide): > "Look, the most powerful strength of the United States is the naval fleet and we aren't going to get one, or our geography isn't set up to use one the way the United States can."
Marshal Yazov: > "For the Americans, the main means of atomic attack is the fleet."
Marshal Akhromeyev (1987 US visit): > "You know where our submarines are, but we don't know where yours are. It's destabilizing. You, you the United States Navy, are the problem."
Admiral Trost: > "Yeah, the inability of the Soviet Union to maintain a strong defensive capability led to the demise of the Soviet Union and to the removal of the Soviets as a major threat to us."
Soviets couldn't counter US submarine threat to nuclear forces financially/technologically, so war termination only option.
Beyond US actions (navel-gazing). Carl von Clausewitz: reciprocity in war, interaction of both sides. Arnold Toynbee: civilizations die from suicide, not murder.
Soviet Union an empire; its collapse meant losing Cold War. Domino theory applied to communism, not capitalism: democratic contagion spread in Warsaw Pact. 1988-89: demonstrations in Eastern Bloc/Soviet Union for political freedoms, freedom from Soviets, crumbling economies.
Gorbachev welcomed/encouraged Eastern Bloc reforms (glasnost, perestroika), as at home. Started in Poland: worker unrest 1956, 1970, 1976, 1980-81. Solidarity in 1981. 1988 strikes: standard of living shrunk >3%, government out of cash, wanted to raise food prices.
Deal: Solidarity calls off strikes for political talks. Roman Catholic Church (enormous credibility, Polish pope) favored Solidarity. Roundtable discussions February 1989, Soviets encouraged: advisor said find quick solutions—Poland's mistakes itty-bitty, Soviets' big.
Polish Communists jiggered election rules. Elections same day as Tiananmen Massacre (Deng Xiaoping). Solidarity won every compete-able seat but one; only 3 communist-designated seats won—rest "none of the above" (Church instructed). Communist legitimacy wrecked, on to democracy.
Four months later, 40th anniversary East Germany founding: 70,000 demonstrated Leipzig, then 1.4 million in 200+ demonstrations within week. No tanks; Erich Honecker out (ruinous debt policies since 1971). Council of Ministers resigns, then Politburo November 8, government issues new travel regulations November 9.
Günter Schabowski at press conference wings answer: new travel regs effective "immediately." Crowds at Berlin Wall gates; guards open one, East Germans pour into West Berlin. First week: >half East Germany's population visited West; within month, 1% emigrated. Pivotal decision: no going back.
Schabowski: > "Gosh, we hadn't a clue that opening the wall was the beginning of the end of East Germany."
Russians shocked by unpopularity. Yuri Ryzhov (scientist, parliamentarian): > "All of our former satellites by compulsion cast off from us as fast and as far as possible."
Anatoly Kovalev (deputy foreign minister): > "Look, we had no confidence whatsoever concerning whom the East German army is going to shoot, the demonstrators or us. And the same thing for the Polish and Hungarian armies."
Unrest in empire forced Soviet forfeit.
Real problem: satellites unhealthy. 1960 map: green places (colonies) become independent, sick of Western colonizers; Soviets offer program to compete with West, many takers. Late 1980s: Soviets on roll, but late 1970s recession tanked commodity prices into 1980s. Wrecked exports for Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Nicaragua (halved in cases).
Soviets dependent on oil exports (55% of budget). Brezhnev had non-performing allies without money. Dumped money in Third World while own nationalities unhappy, wanting out. All revolt simultaneously. Rule for continental empire: no two-front wars. Russia had too many fronts.
Unrest in internal nationalities from Gorbachev in: student movements Kazakhstan, Yakutia. By 1990, 76 ethnic rebellions. Too much to handle. Bankrupted self with Third World while ignoring internal nationalities' revolts.
Communism failed as economic system. Soviet growth good post-WWII rebuilding, stagnated mid-1970s. Decade before Gorbachev: 1-2% lower than US, enormous compounding effects. Everyone lying: subunits lie about inventories (less than actual) and needs (more than actual) for central plan. Aggregated lies mean government clueless on capital/labor value, productivity, consumer preferences.
Misallocation unnoticed until catastrophe. Rotting 20-40% crops, importing agriculture with scarce hard currency. Oil prices down spirals economy: from Gorbachev 1985 to Russia trough 1998, crashing share of world GDP by Eastern Bloc.
Soviet statistics show soaring deficits, trade imbalances, debt, and double-digit negative GNP growth—shrinkage. Marshal Yazov: "We simply lack the power of all these wealthy NATO nations. We had to find an alternative to the arms race." Foreign service officer Anatoly Adamishin: "Our problems began with the departure from isolation. The main reasons for collapse were internal, not external reasons. The Soviet economy was literally exhausted from this monstrous arms race, militarism, enemies with half the world." Gorbachev told the Central Committee: "We're encircled not by invincible armies, but by superior economies." He often said, "Living this way any longer is impossible."
Powerful argument: Soviet economy lost the Cold War.
Alexis de Tocqueville: "The most dangerous moment for a bad government is when it begins to reform." Russians agree Gorbachev's role was pivotal.
Gorbachev's false assumptions:
- Irreversible direction of history toward communism, not back to capitalism (Eastern Europe U-turned to capitalism).
- Leonid Shebarshin (senior KGB): "The thought never occurred to the government that it's possible to withdraw from socialism."
Soviet Union as inverted empire: Eastern Europe more well-educated and richer than Russians—like a donut empire. Russians could no longer siphon wealth, explaining desire to leave (and why Putin wants them back).
Gorbachev expected credit for liberating Eastern Europe, not blame for enserfing them (clock began on his watch, not Stalin's).
Anatoly Chernyaev (Gorbachev adviser): Gorbachev thought Eastern satellites would adopt socialism with a human face. "He made an enormous mistake because these countries brutally turned their back on us." Politics with former friends totally unexpected. (Speaker: If that's brutal, what was Stalin? You occupy, shoot leaders, install puppets, siphon wealth, impose failing economy—why expect liking? US intervenes, aids, leaves, still disliked.)
Gorbachev believed:
- Warsaw Pact disappearance → NATO disappears.
- Comecon disappearance → European Community (later EU) disappears.
- US shares continental outlook, opposes unified/strong Germany.
During German unrest, Gorbachev vacations; Bush Sr. and Chancellor Kohl fast-track fully sovereign unified Germany in NATO.
Gorbachev supporters blamed him: foreign policy mistakes from domestic ones destroyed Soviet Union. Vladimir Lukin: "Gorbachev was no Deng Xiaoping." Arbatov: "The stupidity of our leaders caused the disintegration of the Soviet Union."
Sins of commission (Gorbachev's actions) vs. sins of omission.
Red Army didn't crush demonstrators like Deng Xiaoping's tanks in China (Communists still in power 30+ years later). Timely tank deployments (TTD) could have changed Cold War outcome.
Boris Yeltsin:
- Removed Article 6 from Soviet Constitution (Communist Party monopoly on power).
- Signed Belavezha Accords with Ukraine/Belarus heads, dissolving Soviet Union—suicide on purpose, enabling multiparty system and independence.
Inevitable collapse (any of above): objectionable system, brutally inefficient economy; even Russians didn't want it. Yuri Ryzhov (rocket scientist): "The main reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union is the rottenness of its system." Teimuraz Stepanov: "From the beginning the genes of disintegration were contained in the genetics of this governmental political formation."
Opposite: Took every single factor for West to win Cold War. Anatoly Kovalev (deputy foreign minister): "All these factors merge—internal, ideological, economic, military—it's all of them. You remove any one and you get a different outcome. Maybe the Cold War ends, but completely differently." West barely won, fortunate.
Plus confluence of talented leaders: George Bush Sr. (WWII Navy pilot war hero, Yale BA honors, Texas rep after oil millionaire, UN ambassador, PRC rep pre-relations, CIA director, Reagan VP 8 years) and Helmut Kohl (longest-serving chancellor since Bismarck, PhD history/political science, business, state rep/governor, CDU chair 25 years).
Kohl buys East Germany "one tourist at a time": East Germans travel to West (eased regulations for money, like Poles; Erich Honecker's 1971 debt-based paradigm for social/consumer benefits unsustainable—30% living standard drop to balance). Kohl pays East Germany hundreds of millions Deutschmarks for travel easing; Hungary 0.5 billion Deutschmarks to open Austrian border.
10-point unification program: Big bucks to unraveling Soviet economy—100 million Deutschmarks food (esp. meat).
Berlin Wall breached; by Jan 1990, Bush/Kohl fast-track unification before Gorbachev falls.
Gorbachev against united Germany in NATO. US State Dept: go slow. Kohl's coalition Foreign Minister Genscher skeptical. Britain/France oppose (fear economic eclipse).
Bush/Kohl divide tasks:
- Kohl reassures Soviets (financial unification via Deutschmark controls money/decisions; Soviets fixated on military).
- Bush manages Western alliances, delays meetings.
Tag-team diplomacy overwhelms Gorbachev amid Soviet shrinkage. Trades escalate:
- Unified Germany: 5 billion Deutschmarks.
- States choose alliances (NATO ok): US 9 assurances + trade deal.
- Economic union: London Declaration invites Eastern Europe to NATO coordination; Gorbachev gets G7 summit aid promise.
- Full German NATO membership: Germany gives 15 billion Deutschmarks (new apartments for repatriated Soviet soldiers to focus on furniture, not coup); agrees Polish borders (Stalin shifted Poland 200km west, took 1/3 German territory; 12M German refugees expelled, 2M died).
Unification mid-Sept 1990. Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait (debts from Iran war, esp. to Kuwait; gain oil fields for swing producer status). Cold War over: Gorbachev cooperates for money, supports Iraq out of Kuwait but no regime change (Iraq owes USSR $10-13B).
Yevgeny Primakov missions: evacuates Russian then Western hostages pre-bombing.
Sergei Tarasenko (Shevardnadze aide): Force via UN (Russia veto power); convinced China too.
Anatoly Kovalev: Red lines—no US troops in Iraq, no regime change/division (sacred territorial integrity). Ground war ends after 100 hours to preserve Cold War termination.
France's Mitterrand/UK's Thatcher opposed unification (marginalization fears). Thatcher: "Germany will be the Japan of Europe and worse than Japan." "Germans will get in peace what Hitler couldn't get in war." Wanted Red Army in Germany.
Bush to Kohl: "I'm not going to beat my chest and dance on the Berlin Wall." Avoided humiliating Gorbachev to prevent hardliner takeover (20 years delay till Putin; time for Eastern Europe to integrate with West).
Cost: Bush no reelection, no credit. Anatoly Adamishin: "Difficult to deny the Soviet Union was the one that ended the Cold War." Edwin Meese: "The Cold War began because of Soviet policies and it ended in a sense because of Soviet policies." Nobel to Gorbachev, not Bush, for liberating Eastern Europe.
More complicated than "Ronnie did it."
More interesting: How did centrally planned, inefficient, brutal colonial empire survive 74 years into 20th century?
Example: North Korea—ongoing 21st-century famines, once richest Korean part; authoritarian regimes maintain coercive power. Asymmetry: years to educate/raise leaders, seconds to assassinate. Destruction easy.
Soviet: multiple intelligence orgs (Stalin tracked all); monopolize info; pay off nomenklatura elites. Humans sustain dictatorships long (slaves, serfs). By 1960s-70s, GNP 60%
America had an incredibly dynamic economy. In the 40s and 50s, the Soviet Union had much higher growth rates, so much so that prominent economists like Paul Samuelson predicted that by the 90s, the Soviet Union would have a bigger economy than America. This is surprising given central planning, where people dictate how much steel to make and which company gets cotton fabric and cement for hundreds of millions of people. It's shocking they had notable growth rates after World War II for decades.
War Economy and Perpetual Mobilization
It's a war economy, putting all money into a big military. Russians define greatness as being a big military power with territory. Most countries mobilize in wartime, like America in World War II with rationing and no market prices, using ration cards. The Soviets kept it forever, never getting rid of it.
Data Reliability Issues
Soviet data is problematic because the ruble is non-convertible, and they measured in weight. They claimed to be the greatest TV producer because they made the heaviest TVs, which spontaneously combusted and burned down apartment buildings. Murray Feshbach adjusted their statistics. CIA estimated 20% of the Soviet budget devoted to the military, but after the Cold War, it was at least double, maybe triple. Paul Samuelson's data was inaccurate, just a guess.
Examples of Inefficiencies
Top-down commands required producing certain amounts of steel, so factories made thicker bars to count as greater production, though thinner sheets were needed. Other factories thinned it down, double-counting both in GDP, with massive waste. Heavy TVs used four times the inputs needed. Prices are a miracle, per Adam Smith’s invisible hand; markets are more efficient.
Simpler Economies and Heavy Industry Focus
Early 20th-century economies were simpler, focused on heavy industry like cement, steel, concrete, fabrics, coal, more workable for command economies than commanding SaaS tools today. Communists insisted on heavy industry, neglecting consumer goods. Successful countries like Japan (Meiji Restoration), Taiwan, Korea started with light industry and consumer goods like bicycles and textiles, raising living standards before heavy industry.
Centralized regime built according to 30s plans emphasizing heavy industry, even post-war. In the 70s-80s, US had rust belt collapse, better to leave industries behind for dynamism than Soviet entire economy becoming a rust belt. Soviets missed the plastics revolution, an incredible material. In late 80s Russia, no plastic tubs for sour cream; brought glass jars for filthy ladle filling. Missed computer revolution, impacting Reagan winning military race—no chips for ballistic missiles.
Oil explained Soviet sustenance and collapse. By late 50s, growth rates declined vs. America’s postwar boom. In '59, discovered massive Siberian oil fields. From 1973-1985, 80% of hard currency earnings from oil, used to import grain and technology since central planning couldn’t produce them, sustaining Red Army, population, subsidizing Eastern Europe. Prices collapsed in 1985. Without Siberian reserves, couldn’t afford Africa programs; would have been reduced. Also had northern gas reserves pumped to Europe, requiring big investments and Western help for pipelines, compressors—debated under Reagan, Europeans wanted to sell. Spent all oil wealth maximally, like governments forgetting rainy days.
Post-Collapse Recovery and Putin
After Soviet collapse, living standards imploded for 20 years. Putin popular 2000s as oil went from $10 to $140/barrel (2000-2008), crediting leaders for macro trends. Brilliant Soviet management dispersed empire plane parts, leaving quarters of planes post-collapse. Putin spent oil money on people, raising standards initially, then pursued empire.
Eastern satellites recovered gangbusters: East Germany, Poland success. Russia had terrible period. Eastern Europe more connected to West pre-war: Czechoslovakia highly developed, tied to West; Poland Enlightenment center (Copernicus). In '88-'89, Polish leaders asked Bush Sr. for banking, financial, legal expertise; Bush provided, farming to private sector for free consulting. Russians thought they knew it all, no broad requests like Jeffrey Sachs in Moscow. Tsars riffed off Mongol Empire, taking cuts from trade, selling commodities, no high-end manufacturing tradition like Western Europe’s commercial sea routes. No kid lemonade stands or paper routes teaching commerce.
Gorbachev’s economic reforms with glasnost and perestroika worsened stagnation, causing hyperinflation. He prioritized political reforms, giving away political power before fixing economics—unlike China holding political power while reforming economics. No tradition for reforms. Pre-Industrial Revolution, flat Russia invaded by neighbors needed big army, war economy, funneling economics there. Britain had rich merchants influencing laws, navy sent away unlike standing army.
Decentralization Without Markets
Gorbachev decentralized to quasi-firms without believing in markets, prices, private property—immoral to him. Firms intermediated via corruption, backroom deals for scarce resources. No legal system, which takes time to develop.
Eastern Europe increasingly indebted, unable to produce competitive exports, pursued technological miracles via over-leverage for Western machinery. Desperate communist leaders had few cards left, also importing food/consumer goods for unrest, VCRs. In 1988-89 Moscow, family craved VCR bought at diplomatic store with hard currency for meals. Western movies showed abundance like Berkeley Bowl fruit, gasping Russians. Raisa Gorbachev likely realized welfare mothers had better Walmart access. Soviet supermarkets had 77 items total, meat rotten-smelling. Made borscht from peasant market bones, Hungarian beets/rotten apples, Romanian canned tomatoes, gelatinous rotten potato spots. Candy store had edible Polish caramel. Central control better for fewer standardized items; GDP compared by pound ignores quality (rotten vs. Idaho potatoes).
In 1988-89, watched Tiananmen on Soviet TV due to Gorbachev in Beijing. Optimism for full democracy, unaware of capitalist work ethic (many >40 hours/week), missing education beyond Marx. Learning Stalinist history truths. Exuberance in educated Moscow/St. Petersburg for freedom to understand history, but countryside worse. Suspected family Stalin traumas but shocked by extent, expected quick improvement, extreme disappointment. Felt West owed aid for communist model setbacks; Bush worried money would corrupt without legal structure.
Liberal capitalism was more appealing and out-produced communism, making peripheral communist gains like in Brazil less significant. Protecting liberal economies in Europe and Japan is crucial to sustain the liberal economic game. Economic miracles in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong demonstrated liberal economies' effectiveness. Abandoning these places undermines that demonstration.
The Cold War drove tremendous economic growth worldwide, especially in the Third World, as civil wars ended proxy escalations where losers sought help from the US or Soviets, leading to mutual destruction and tens of millions of deaths. Ending these conflicts allowed compounding growth. Communist systems excel at installing dictators in civil wars—Mao's rise exemplifies this—but produce compounding poverty afterward.
Countering communist guerrillas often required supporting dictators, likely better than communist alternatives like Pol Pot or Mao. This was problematic. Even without dictators, countering Soviets alienated countries, like India in the Indo-Pakistani context to counter the Soviet Union. Solutions are unclear: hands-off approaches ignore growth demonstrations under capitalism, but engagement risks objectionable regimes.
Post-WWII Generosity and Optimism
The WWII generation was optimistic and generous. American servicemen were adored in Europe. The GI Bill provided college educations and home loans to white Americans (excluding African Americans), fueling growth and optimism, shifting families from manual labor.
US generosity extended abroad via the Marshall Plan, which profited both sides. Win-wins incentivize cooperation—basic strategy. Zero-sum approaches like "I get everything, you get nothing" fail long-term, unlike clickbait wins.
Payoffs often lag elections. George Bush ended the Cold War on Western terms but lost reelection. Americans focus on daily actions, missing decade-long implications, like tax policy racking up debt. West Germany's 60 billion Deutschmarks to Gorbachev for East German unification was a bargain for decades of growth. Politicians think of the next election; statesmen think of the next generation. Bush, Helmut Kohl, and Mitterrand (Maastricht Treaty) exemplified statesmanship, as did WWII leaders.
Soviets tried buying influence, especially post-1973 oil crisis when prices skyrocketed, enabling Brezhnev-era imports and net exports to Eastern European satellites. Soviet data is questionable—everything worthwhile was imported. They provided military and foreign aid coercively but lacked US resources.
Soviets spent 2% of GDP on nuclear weapons alone at peak. Arms control quip: enough weapons to destroy the world many times over. Purpose of marginal weapons unclear. US developed tactical nukes, risky as deployers were in blast range. Massive redundancy and maintenance puzzles remain.
Sino-Soviet split forced Soviets to station a million soldiers on Siberian front, costing 2% GDP—just for one front, equivalent to many nations' total defense. Slightly higher economic growth could offset this diplomatic coup, reinforcing economy-first priority.
Soviet Backwardness Anecdotes
Moscow was breathtakingly backwards: awful consumer goods, joke cars like Ladas, buildings prioritizing nukes. Hospitals outside Moscow lacked running water; one needed stitches but first hospital had no thread.
Satellites attempted escape repeatedly: Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Poland via Solidarity. Red Army (millions strong) previously crushed them with tanks. In late 80s/early 90s, they didn't shoot due to generational change—ruthless leaders gone, lacking stomach for splattering civilians.
Gorbachev's generation, horrified by 1968 Czechoslovakia, sought alternatives. Gorbachev reflected this, with exuberance for perestroika and glasnost, encouraging Poles. Lacked market expertise from command economy life.
De Tocqueville on Reforms
De Tocqueville: revolutions occur when governments reform. Gorbachev's perestroika/glasnost triggered conservative Communist Party resistance. Dismantling party secretariat devolved power to republics, which demanded independence.
Reforms erode power. Gradual legal reforms via Duma recommended, seeking EU expert help. Reparations complicate post-Putin path. Ukraine's existential threat forces institutional cleanup.
Outsiders demand instant fixes, ignoring complexity. US healthcare (20% GDP) or crazy tax code can't be overhauled easily—tax accountants, misdirected cash prove it. Flat tax idea died. Budget issues persist, yet focus diverts to bathrooms over tax code.
North Korea Reform Trap
North Korea can't reform: outside info reveals government lies, as Eastern Europeans saw bisected countries' wealth gaps (e.g., South Korea richer).
Kim Jong-un trapped—retirement means death. Asian belief: regimes last three generations. He's third; self-fulfilling prophecy may end it.
Post-1973 to 1985 oil boom: no rainy-day fund despite half budget/foreign currency from volatile oil. Milked it via consumption (Western grain), no investment. Critics noted zero savings.
Russia's 20th century: tsarism, communism, collectivization, >10% population died in WWII, Stalin, economic collapse, Putin. Satellites worse with invasions. Japan/Germany recovered post-tragedy.
Russia's Challenges
Pre-Industrial harsh geography bred ruthlessness, wiping out neighbors' elites. Post-Industrial Revolution, power from wealth via commerce, trade, industry needs legal systems, institutions, stability. Russia lacks Renaissance, Reformation; negative historical space. Putin setback takes generation to recover, with reparations demands.
First Cold War stayed cold in industrialized world (good, avoided nuclear), tragic elsewhere. West's thoughtful strategy enabled non-nuclear Soviet collapse. Americans lived fulfilling lives (Disneyland, trips, houses) while paying taxes for arms. For second Cold War: cooperate with allies, build institutions, improve laws. Avoid burning house, dumping allies/universities (tech edge relies on them). Don't mimic Soviet stale leadership/debt. Get house in order via strategic tools.
Covers everything from individual wars to the strategic and tactical decisions which explain them, to the broader lessons for today's world. Interviews lots of different kinds of people, but from a sort of view-per-minute average-adjusted basis, hosts a Sarah Paine podcast. If you just sort by popular, Sarah Paine comes up a lot.
You've got it backwards. I was an unknown academic and then you cold-called me about doing an interview. I said, "Sure." Dwarkesh, as a result of all this, I'm getting emails from all over the place. So let's talk about who's grateful to whom.
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