The airline CEO putting Starlink on every plane
In a Nutshell
United Airlines CEO Scott Kirby made massive counter-cyclical bets during COVID, ordering 200+ wide-body aircraft when competitors were retiring fleets, modernizing United's entire tech stack off mainframes, and becoming the first major airline to install Starlink across its fleet. Starlink provides the only fast Wi-Fi option available, driving customer switching behavior and creating a 2-3 year competitive window before other airlines catch up. The strategy centers on building technology differentiation—AI-powered delay communication, weather optimization, and surprise-and-delight features—rather than competing on traditional service metrics where Asian and Gulf carriers have inherent advantages.
These notes were generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies.
Scott Kirby took over United Airlines in May 2020 at the height of the pandemic. Refusing to play defense, he's made massive bets on fleet expansion, premium seats, and Starlink Wi-Fi, creating differentiation in the hugely competitive airline market. Free was never the value proposition. Fast is the value proposition, and there's only one option for fast. It's Starlink. That is the only option. Customers are switching to regional flights specifically because they have Starlink.
During COVID, every single expert in the world said travel demand is going to be down by 50% forever. Kirby ignored the experts outside of two sigma. In the tails, the experts are terrible. He thought COVID was going to be deep and last a long time, and then travel demand will recover. Everyone else around the globe was shrinking, so United did the exact opposite. Literally, every global long-haul airline in the world, except for United, permanently retired part of their wide-body fleets.
United looked at that and said, "We think the premise is wrong, and it's just a huge opportunity to do the opposite." They did the biggest aircraft order in history: 200 wide-bodies, and then several hundred narrow-bodies. The list price for wide-bodies is $400 million each, though United gets a big discount.
Kirby told the board: "This is one of those cases because everyone else is shrinking, we don't have to be right. We just have to be not totally wrong." It's just one of those situations where the odds are so stacked in your favor. Silicon Valley does this all the time: figure out something that you have a different view than everyone else and go big on it. If it works, the returns are huge, and the downsides are smaller.
There's been this cycle with large capital purchases. Samsung came to dominate memory by systematically investing into every downturn because it's very cyclical. The flip side of that is everyone wants to invest when it's at its peak. You want to invest when everyone else is not investing, when things are down, and not invest when things are up. For airlines, assets are 30-year life. They're going to go through several recessions and several ups and downs. It's a little harder to do that, but you get better terms, better deals. United got really good pricing during COVID because they were the only one in the world ordering airplanes. They re-launched the market. For Boeing, they could go to other customers and say, "Look, United believes. You should, too."
There are two things that are human nature that are mistakes. One is to extrapolate the current into the future. Assume that everything that's happening today is going to continue into the future. Two, trusting people on surveys. Surveys are the absolute worst way to figure out what's going to happen in the future. The travel experts did surveys, and people were terrified because everyone was dying. When asked if they were going to travel internationally again, they said no. That was true what they thought at the time. But once it was over, of course, they were going to go back to traveling again.
Experts live in the world of two standard deviations. They force-fit everything into the things that they've already seen. When things happen outside two standard deviations, when the tails happen, which is where you create all the value. Value at Risk is the dumbest model in history. Things that shouldn't happen in the history of the universe happened once every five years. Because it's a dumb, fundamentally flawed mathematical model that assumes everything is normally distributed. The world is not normally distributed. The tails are much fatter in everything that matters.
Kirby likes surveys for how did people feel about stuff we've already done. He ignores surveys for what are we going to do in the future. Apple famously does not do a lot of focus group testing on their products. They just build the products they want to build. United rolled out a Starlink tracker without asking anyone about it. Kirby sits on an airplane and talks to customers, and he knows they're going to think that's cool. And they do think it's cool.
In a world of AI, you can do so much so fast. Some of it doesn't work and people don't care. It takes more time to do a survey or a focus group than just do it. See if they like it. And if they don't, stop. And if they do, do more of it.
Eight months ago, Kirby had not yet had his AI epiphany, but he's always wanted to get on modern platforms. During COVID, another thing United did was double down on technology investment. They started a several-hundred-million-dollar project to get not just on the cloud, but get everything off of mainframes, to build databases that are modern, that they can access the data, to really modernize their tech stack. There was no ROI. There was no payback, which is why companies don't do it. It's really hard to do the ROI on something like that. But what it does is it enables you to move fast and do things. United is doing stuff that other airlines, frankly, can't do because they don't have the right tech stack.
Kirby's AI epiphany is that he doesn't think AI is about summarizing documents. He hired a tutor and took three 1-hour sessions. He has always been into gambling, which helps make big bets on aircrafts. After three 1-hour sessions, completely by himself, he got up on a Saturday morning, went down to the home gym, worked out, took his laptop down there. It took about 2.5 hours of run time, but he did a full workout. In between sets, he was typing prompts. On his own, in two and a half hours, he created a web page that had drop-down menus for what sport you want, what dates you want, what kind of bets you want. Then it would go off to four sportsbooks, pull up all the odds, and you could decide what you wanted to bet and put the dollar amount in. And then it would go to whichever sportsbook had the best odds and make the bet on his behalf.
United had a huge switchover from one of their biggest, most critical mainframe systems. Just in case something goes wrong, they canceled several hundred flights on that day. They don't schedule flights during that window so that in case something goes wrong, they're not putting customers in harm's way. The switch went off without a hitch.
United is bringing much more in-house. They have more in-house, they think, than any airline in the world. They're the only airline in the world that owns their own reservation system. Everyone else has outsourced Sabre and Apollo. United owns their own mainframe, and because they owned it, they locked into it. Copa Airlines in Panama uses it because they're a partner with United. They're the only two airlines in the world that use it.
United is taking over all kinds of other parts of the tech stack. The seat-back entertainment screens are one example. The maps are terrible. The map switches to the globe. By the time you find the information you're looking for, it switches screens. United is taking over the map software from Panasonic. They're taking over the whole software. Because they know who you are, when you log in, your name's there. United wants to have the map on the whole time with your map preferences.
Another cool thing is when you're hitting your two million mile mark, the screen is going to pop up with a little thing in the bottom and say, "Congratulations, Will." It basically is going to do a countdown. The flight attendants are going to know exactly when you hit two million. These surprise-and-delight product touches are quite important.
When United delivers something customers didn't expect, the question is how to handle that becoming a feature. A customer was delayed out of Madison due to a maintenance issue and was totally relaxed because ConnectionSaver was going to save the connection. The gates were next to each other. Then the flight had already closed. They closed it early. The customer was crushed because they'd already internalized it as United doing this amazing thing. United has to get really good at communicating on it. The seat-back screens now are going to be helpful, too. They're going to tell you exactly where it is. If something changes, they're going to text you.
United is going to roll out something by Christmas for Christmas travel. Normally, if there's a weather delay coming on one of your flights, all airlines send you a text that says there may be weather in Denver tomorrow. What United is doing today is when they say that, they say here's other options for flights that you can just switch to. What they're going to do is send you the screen that says your flight to Denver has a 41% chance of being impacted by weather. If you switch to the earlier flight, it's only a 12%. The later flight is a 3%, so that you can have some intelligence about making decisions.
Two years ago at the end-of-the-year officer meeting, Kirby told officers that their job is to wow. Their job is to do things that a customer gets—they're a frequent flyer—gets on the airplane and says, "Wow, I've never seen that before." They get credit for that one time. Then they owe them another wow. It's a culture that means you can't ever rest. You can't be complacent. What are you doing that's new, that's cool? Because every cool thing that United does, a customer should take that for granted. United should do something to surprise you in the future.
All the top global airlines lists are just totally missing the point. The Asian and Gulf airlines do so because they have really nice meals and very well-coiffed flight attendants. What you actually care about is the airline having really good tech. United now believes that United in totality is the best airline in the world, and it's because of technology. It's exponentially getting better. Things like being able to do this for customers when there's a delay and tell them what's going on. United started it this summer. AI allows them to institutionalize this.
In Chicago, there was a day where the weather was over the horizon, but you had to fly. It was sunny at the airport, but you had to fly through this line of thunderstorms, and so the routes were closed. United sent half the people the normal weather delay. They sent half a picture with the radar map. The people with a 1-hour delay had negative 60 NPS on the normal way of sending it, plus 60 when they sent a picture of the map. A 120-point difference. It wasn't just that they weren't mad. They were actually happy. It was better than an on-time flight. People can handle delays. They understand they don't want to do something that's unsafe, but they don't like uncertainty.
Kirby's previous employer told the operations team that anyone that says the word weather in his presence is going to get fired, because he does not want to use weather as an excuse. Weather happens, they're going to be safe, they're never going to do anything that's unsafe, and weather does happen. But the job is to figure out how to minimize the impact of weather, and you can't use weather as an excuse. The culture should be: "We find ways to overcome the challenges." Instead of trying to manage your expectations, United tries to set high expectations and try to meet them.
The biggest limiter of United's business is air traffic control. It's by far air traffic control. Air traffic control is 90% of the issue. United started running simulations with AI for Denver in the summer. Denver has a lot of pop-up thunderstorms that happen around the airport. If a lightning strikes within three miles of the airport, the ramp closes for 30 minutes. Using AI, there'll be a forecast in the afternoon for there's going to be thunderstorms. The FAA just takes the worst case. They limit all the corner posts. They just pull down the amount of traffic that's going through the airport proactively. But when you look at the data, sometimes the weather is to the southeast, sometimes it's not. In most cases, you can use different arrival routes and departure routes, but you can keep the airport running. United can probably reduce 50%–75% of the weather-impacted delays in Denver in the summer by using this technology.
The president is supportive of air traffic control modernization. He's the most pro-aviation president. Secretary Duffy is great. Bryan Bedford is the best FAA administrator they've ever had.
The government faces significant challenges in executing large capital projects due to the appropriations process. These projects typically require five to ten years to complete, but the annual appropriations cycle creates major inefficiencies. Budget approval is often delayed by government shutdowns, potentially pushing start dates two months into the fiscal year. The ramp-up process takes three months, followed by four months of actual work, with the final three months spent shutting down the project due to the twelve-month authorization limit.
Airlines could potentially fund modernization efforts if permitted to do so. However, privatizing the FAA and air traffic control remains politically controversial. Private enterprise could likely complete such modernization in two to three years without requiring full privatization, though a user fee system would be necessary.
The FAA currently operates on a user fee system where airlines pay 100% of the fees, making private jet operations essentially free at 99% subsidy. Private jet operators form a powerful lobby that represents the biggest impediment to FAA modernization efforts. The political dynamics on Capitol Hill focus on job creation in specific districts rather than system efficiency.
Air traffic controllers could operate from centralized facilities anywhere in the country since they primarily work in basements monitoring screens. However, political considerations have resulted in air traffic control facilities in every congressional district, creating systemic inefficiency. With 450 separate facilities, system failures occur frequently, whereas a centralized approach would provide redundancy and backup capabilities.
Air capacity grows at 5% annually, creating an "unstoppable force and immovable object" scenario. The FAA has already implemented flight limitations in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco where capacity limits have been reached. These restrictions will expand to additional locations as the system reaches its management capacity.
Despite planes flying faster than 50 years ago, some flights take longer today due to air traffic control bottlenecks. The speaker acknowledges that current FAA leadership represents the best the agency has ever had, with more modernization progress occurring than in any previous career period, though government constraints prevent leading-edge advancement.
Stripe Economics research on AI productivity revealed a similar paradox: while AI can save workers 1.5 hours per week, these time savings show little relationship to actual work output increases. Making individual system components faster does not necessarily improve overall system productivity. Additional research on AI, productivity, and the internet economy is available at stripeconomics.com.
The speaker addressed competitive dynamics at Chicago, where United holds market advantages over American Airlines. The discussion centered on network effects and the limited number of flights available at Chicago. United operates eight daily flights from Chicago to Milwaukee using small aircraft for catchment-area connectivity, where passengers connect to other destinations rather than terminating their journeys.
United maintains several hundred catchment-area flights within a few hundred miles of Chicago for connecting customers. American operates duplicative services on these routes that provide no benefit to Chicago but support their dual-hub operations. Single-hub airports like Atlanta and Dallas generate more economic activity despite being smaller cities than Chicago.
The dual-hub structure at Chicago creates inefficiency where sixteen daily flights to Milwaukee could be reduced to eight flights on larger aircraft carrying equivalent passengers while freeing capacity for additional long-haul routes to destinations like Paris and Tokyo. The speaker asserts Chicago should be the world's largest airport but is constrained by this structural inefficiency.
American Airlines is projected to lose approximately $1.5 billion in Chicago operations this year. The speaker acknowledges that competitive positioning versus American may influence some commentary, but market share gains demonstrate United's competitive success.
United has achieved unprecedented market share shifts in Chicago, moving from lower market share than American to double the revenue share. Similar significant share gains have occurred against Southwest in Denver and against Southwest and Alaska combined in the Bay Area. The speaker emphasizes these shifts were not specifically targeted at competitors.
Regarding Delta, Starlink implementation represents United's biggest competitive push. The speaker expresses respect for Delta's pioneering work in building brand loyalty and notes that Starlink applies universally rather than as a premium product.
United currently has Starlink on 48% of flights, reaching 50% within one week. The implementation began with smaller aircraft due to FAA certification requirements, with approximately three aircraft certified daily. The MAX 8 fleet shows 25% Starlink probability, while Christmas bookings show 36% probability based on planned installations.
The joint venture with ANA provides competitive advantage on Pacific routes, where customers previously preferred ANA flights but will now choose United due to Starlink availability. The technology differentiation creates customer switching opportunities beyond the initial Starlink attraction.
The decision to implement Starlink was not economically painful despite higher costs, as the performance improvement justified the investment. The implementation strategy focused on heavy maintenance checks when aircraft were already grounded, allowing simultaneous installation. Initially planned for 65% of the fleet due to aircraft retirements, the program expanded after observing customer behavior changes.
Customer anecdotes revealed passengers switching to regional flights specifically for Starlink access. The certainty of Starlink availability versus probability creates significant booking behavior differences, with the airline developing probability tracking tools for the app.
Los Angeles will become the first 100% Starlink hub in the first half of next year. The rollout prioritizes markets based on competitive dynamics and aircraft types, with Boeing 787 certification representing the primary remaining challenge. San Francisco's higher 787 concentration will require longer implementation timelines.
The economic analysis showed CapEx and OpEx requirements were manageable. The speaker considers Delta's delayed Starlink adoption a strategic mistake, noting that other airlines are implementing gradually following United's lead. Traditional airline modification timelines of eight years make the competitive window appear less significant under conventional analysis.
Starlink represents the biggest competitive advantage in airline history, though temporary as all airlines will eventually adopt high-speed low Earth orbit technology. United has a two-to-three-year window to convert Starlink trial customers into loyal customers through superior overall technology and service.
Elon Musk's requirement for free service aligns with United's plans, though the value proposition centers on speed rather than cost. Legacy system implementations offering free but slow service create worse customer experiences due to insufficient bandwidth, with the speaker describing these as "dial-up internet" quality.
United aims to excel across all service dimensions while acknowledging Asian and Middle Eastern carriers' strengths in service and product quality. These competitors benefit from quasi-state entity status and subsidies that United cannot replicate while maintaining profitability.
Leading airlines gain exponential benefits enabling faster innovation and investment. The primary constraint on technology investment is management capacity rather than financial resources, contrasting with competitors focused on quarterly Wall Street expectations.
United's willingness to make larger strategic investments, including major aircraft orders during COVID and Starlink implementation, stems from superior future visibility rather than greater investor permission. The speaker reads extensively to identify opportunities others miss and maintains strong board communication and support.
Wall Street typically opposes major investments, preferring focus on CASM-X metrics. The speaker's philosophy acknowledges Wall Street's short-term orientation while advocating for long-term investment regardless of immediate market reaction. Failed investments warrant CEO dismissal, creating accountability for strategic decisions.
The airline industry has evolved from cumulative losses since Kitty Hawk through 1992 to more robust profitability, though six of ten US airlines are projected to lose money in the current year. United projects $5 billion profit despite $8 billion higher fuel costs, demonstrating structural improvement.
Two winning US airlines have emerged: United and Delta, both having created brand loyalty beyond schedule commodity competition. However, ego-driven route decisions persist, with some airlines operating routes with negative 30-50% margins.
United's international expansion includes 53 Atlantic destinations by next summer, up from 23 destinations ten years ago. Only two routes have failed and been discontinued. New destinations include Nuuk, Greenland, and pilgrimage routes in Spain and Portugal identified through creative market analysis rather than traditional data.
Route planner Patrick Quayle leads an innovative team that identifies opportunities outside conventional data analysis. The Nuuk route succeeded despite lacking historical data, while the Bergen, Norway route was discontinued after minimal losses. The fungible nature of aircraft assets enables experimental route launches with low exit costs.
Pilgrimage routes in Spain and Portugal were identified through research on broken itineraries showing passengers using competitor airlines for return flights. Catholic pilgrimage participants fly into one city, walk several hundred miles, then depart from another city, requiring simultaneous route additions.
Patrick Quayle's recent trip to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan identified potential future route opportunities pending resolution of Russian airspace restrictions.
Greenland has a population of 50,000 people and is rapidly building new airports as the primary means of transportation. The country recently replaced the international airport in Nuuk, and United Airlines added a new route there. They're also replacing the airport in Narsarsuaq in the south with a new full jet-capable international airport. These capital projects are popular in a small country with limited spending options, and tourism can drive economic growth for the population.
The Boeing 737 first flew in 1967 at Mach 0.78, and the 737 MAX today flies at essentially the same speed. While fuel efficiency has improved by 50% and safety has increased 30 to 40 times, the rate of technological advancement in airframes is considered maddeningly slow. The book "Impossible Factory" about Skunk Works and Clarence "Kelly" Johnson is referenced, noting that the SR-71 and U-2 were developed from start to finish in just a couple of years.
Boeing and Airbus have a global duopoly and have quietly agreed not to invest in new airframes, effectively pacing the frontier rather than pushing it. Neither company's investors want them to invest in new aircraft development. There have been 20+ years of requests for a 757 replacement that both manufacturers have refused to pursue. A third aircraft manufacturer is needed to restore competition.
Beyond speed, which requires significantly more fuel, the next generation of airframes should focus on blended wing bodies similar to the B-2 bomber for improved efficiency. Investment has been made in JetZero, which is developing this technology. While blended wing bodies create airport challenges due to their larger size, this is primarily a gate reconfiguration issue rather than a fundamental barrier. Engine technology is also identified as an area for advancement.
United is introducing "Relax Row" in coach later this year or next year, where three seats can convert into a bed for passengers to lay down. This is positioned as a family-friendly innovation, with the CEO having seven children and viewing air travel through the lens of a parent traveling alone with young kids. The goal is to make travel easy for families, which benefits everyone.
Relax Row is viewed as a brand-building initiative rather than a pure profit center. It's described as "cool" and good for families, with the philosophy that making travel easy for families makes it great for everyone. Starlink is similarly positioned as family-friendly, allowing kids to watch shows like Bluey on seat-back entertainment, keeping parents relaxed.
United ran ads highlighting their Wi-Fi and other innovations. The campaign was timed to coincide with crossing the 50% fleet installation threshold, which occurred the Friday after the interview. Maggie Schmerin, VP running the marketing effort, executed the campaign without seeking approval, demonstrating the value of trust and reduced bureaucracy in enabling creative, fast decision-making.
Before 1978, airlines operated under heavy regulation with government-approved routes and government-set fares. Airlines competed on perks rather than price, leading to the elaborate service seen in 1960s photographs. The current market system with real price competition is considered superior to the regulated era.
The slot system represents a breakdown of free market competition in air travel. Scheduling more flights than an airport can handle is bad for customers. Newark implemented slot control and became the most reliable airport as a result. Chicago has a problematic system where gates are reallocated annually with time delays, leading to American losing six gates to United when American focused on Sun Belt expansion while United maintained pre-COVID schedules.
Major airports have increased expenses by approximately 70% since pre-COVID. New York airports charge $52 per passenger, which made Spirit Airlines' $58 average fare economically impossible before covering fuel, aircraft, employees, and maintenance. This pricing has effectively priced low-cost carriers out of major airports.
The low-cost carrier model requires flying to low-cost airports to maintain price advantages. Southwest originally flew to Oakland instead of San Francisco, and Burbank/Ontario instead of LAX. Ryanair continues this strategy, avoiding Heathrow and Charles de Gaulle for secondary airports. All US low-cost carriers abandoned this approach and flew into expensive airports like Chicago, Newark, and San Francisco, leading to their failures.
In-N-Out exemplifies discipline by not chasing growth beyond one day's drive from distribution centers, maintaining a narrow menu, and staying within their core competency. This contrasts with companies that expand beyond their strengths and lose their competitive advantages.
All major US airlines (American, Delta, Northwest, Continental) previously tried to compete with Southwest by creating internal low-cost subsidiaries, and all failed. Southwest is now attempting to compete with legacy carriers and is similarly unlikely to succeed. The principle is to stick to what you're good at rather than trying to be something you're not.
Ryanair, led by Michael O'Leary, is the only consistently successful low-cost carrier globally. They maintain discipline by avoiding transatlantic routes where they can't achieve sufficient aircraft turns, and they reject Wi-Fi on short flights, arguing passengers can use their phones for an hour. This represents the discipline required for low-cost carrier success.
United's strength lies in flying to hubs rather than point-to-point routes. In Dallas, United doesn't compete with American because 75% of American's Dallas-Los Angeles passengers are connecting from other destinations, leaving United competing for only 25% of the market. United flies to hubs where they can capture connecting traffic.
In a 30-year career, three hubs have been closed with no new ones opened. Building new hubs is considered nearly impossible, with no successful examples in the post-deregulation era. The Southeast represents an opportunity gap where United is third behind Delta's Atlanta hub and American's Charlotte hub, but no airport has sufficient capacity for 600 daily flights needed for competitiveness.
United has added marginal connecting flights from existing hubs, including Hong Kong to Thailand and Vietnam, Ulaanbaatar from Tokyo, and Kaohsiung from Narita. These additions were based on data showing significant percentages of passengers ultimately trying to reach these destinations. Sapporo service is performing well, driven partly by tech industry interest from San Francisco.
Route selection makes or breaks airlines. Bad routes that lose money cannot be offset by excellence elsewhere. When reviewing route P&L, any route described as "strategic" that loses money should be cancelled. Common justifications include corporate customers or credit card benefits, but these rationalizations should be rejected.
The perception that airlines are primarily credit card businesses is incorrect because it ignores costs. United carries over 50,000 people daily flying free using credit card miles, representing a significant cost not reflected in revenue-only analyses. The contribution profit calculation is incomplete when focusing solely on revenue.
United eliminated the segment requirement for status qualification, simplifying the program. The changes aim to maintain appropriate exclusivity levels, with the goal of keeping lounges less crowded. Global Services membership is deliberately limited to maintain exclusivity and brand loyalty.
Frequent flyer program decisions are evaluated through the lens of brand loyalty impact. Changes that detract from brand loyalty require strong justification. The approach prioritizes maintaining the value and exclusivity of elite status while avoiding the customer backlash that Delta experienced with their changes.
During COVID, United was the only airline to double down on club investment. Club square footage has more than doubled since pre-COVID levels and is planned to grow by another 50%. The pandemic created a unique opportunity where spending money without customers present allowed faster expansion without customer complaints. Closing clubs temporarily to expand them is complicated and can anger customers in the short term, but it was feasible during COVID.
Changes to the frequent flyer program focus on building loyalty. Adding more first-class seats is limited by available aircraft capacity. The program is calibrated to deliver value for loyal customers, sometimes by ensuring fewer people are eligible for premium experiences.
The CEO previously ran the Star Alliance board. Alliances are now locked in, making switching difficult. The primary customer value comes from connecting to destinations United doesn't serve directly. United operates four times as many flights into Frankfurt and Munich as American and Delta combined, thanks to the Lufthansa partnership. Approximately 60% of passengers on these flights connect beyond Munich to places like Kazakhstan.
The downside is that partner flights don't feel like United. Progress has been made to standardize the experience. United now requires seat assignments for their customers on partner airlines, threatening to cut off partnerships if this requirement isn't met.
United is the largest alliance member and provides the most customers, giving them leverage with partners. Lufthansa is the second-largest, while ANA is significant across the Pacific. Smaller partners like Croatia Airlines are valued for their culture and willingness to try new technology initiatives despite limited economic contribution.
The CEO believes delivering a better consumer experience is the winning formula in non-commodity businesses. Consolidation eliminates duplicative flights in capacity-constrained airports, enabling more selection. The vision extends beyond efficiency to creating a U.S. airline that Americans can be proud of, comparable to Emirates for Dubai or Singapore Airlines for Singapore.
The U.S. faces a massive trade deficit with international airlines, with two-thirds of long-haul seats into the U.S. operated by foreign competitors despite only 40% of customers coming from overseas. These competitors benefit from state subsidies. The goal is creating a U.S. airline that can compete head-to-head with subsidized global entities.
The CEO manages seven children alongside running a global airline through strict time efficiency. He limits meetings to 2-3 hours daily and avoids time-wasting activities. He doesn't use social media directly (though he writes his own LinkedIn and Instagram content), doesn't watch TV, and sleeps 8.5 hours nightly, sometimes over nine hours.
He uses a spoon 90% of the time instead of a fork, including for salads. He cuts up salad components and mixes them together, claiming this method is faster, prevents ingredients from falling off utensils, and delivers better flavor by capturing all components together.
He views the American business culture of sleep deprivation as counterproductive, noting cognitive effects are well-documented. When card counting in Vegas, he previously slept only three hours nightly to maximize table time. Realizing that fatigue caused counting errors and financial losses, he returned to his 8.5-hour sleep schedule.
Due to card counting activities, he is barred from playing blackjack in Vegas casinos. During a Super Bowl visit, a manager reminded him of the 15-year-old ban at Bellagio when he attempted to set up a poker credit line. He is permitted to play other games but remains restricted from blackjack.
Card counting has become nearly impossible due to multiple decks, frequent shuffling, and rule changes like 6/5 blackjack payouts that alter the mathematical odds against players.
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