What Robert Caro learned about power after studying it for 50 years
In a Nutshell
Robert Caro spent 50 years studying power through exhaustive research on Lyndon Johnson and Robert Moses, revealing that true power stems from relentless will, strategic leverage, and the ability to get big things done despite opposition. Both subjects began as idealists but were hardened by power—Moses evicting thousands for infrastructure, Johnson wielding Senate control through committee assignments and funding—showing how authority transforms those who wield it. The central dilemma is balancing decisive action with democratic safeguards, as America now struggles with over-correction that makes building infrastructure nearly impossible while China moves at a "Moses-type" pace.
These notes were generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies.
"If you do everything, you will win." This was the maxim by which Lyndon Johnson lived his life.
Robert Caro spent 50 years writing about Lyndon Johnson, living in the Texas Hill Country to understand Johnson's youth, sifting through millions of documents in Senate and presidential libraries, and conducting interviews ranging from the former goon who helped Johnson steal an election to the chauffeur who drove him on his first desperate campaign.
Caro shares a quality of relentlessness with both Johnson and Robert Moses - refusing to take no for an answer and refusing to leave a stone unturned. When people refused interviews, Caro persisted because he felt certain people had to be interviewed.
The Example of Johnson's First Secretary
Caro needed to interview Lyndon Johnson's first secretary, the one who rode in the car with him on campaigns. He explained: "There's no other human being on earth who knows what Lyndon Johnson is doing all these hours driving back and forth across Texas. I don't know what I have to do, but I have to get him to tell me honestly about this thing."
When interviewing people who knew it wasn't good for them to share information, Caro succeeded by asking terrific questions. He would use his extensive research to create leverage - for example, with John Connally regarding how Johnson used money to get political power.
Caro knew Connally collected the money and gave it out at Johnson's instructions. He had been through the notes showing Johnson's annotations on requests for money: sometimes approving $1,500, sometimes reducing to $500, sometimes writing "no," and sometimes "No, never." When Caro asked Connally what "No, never" meant, Connally replied, "This guy was never going to get money from Lyndon Johnson." This led to deeper, more fascinating stories about Johnson's decision-making.
The Power Broker, published decades ago, influenced the creation of environmental review, land use review, community boards, and litigation processes. Critics argue these safeguards have overcorrected, making it too difficult to build infrastructure - citing the Second Avenue subway as an example that took 50 years to build a mile and a half at a cost of over $4 billion.
When Moses started in the 1920s, there were already safeguards preventing construction. Property owners resisted roads being built through their land. Moses built despite these obstacles through sheer force of will. He identified Jones Beach as the greatest beach he'd seen, only 27 miles from New York City, and determined to build a road to make it accessible.
Caro identifies a profound question for democracies: how to avoid both extremes - the unchecked power of 1950s-60s Moses and the current paralysis. He notes California spent $15 billion over the last decade without getting a single new mile of railway, while China built tens of thousands of miles of railways in 10-20 years with a Moses-type attitude, though at the cost of displacement and recklessness.
Caro argues that every once in a while someone comes along who is a genius at getting big things built for the public. Decades may pass when nothing gets built, then someone suddenly appears and things move forward. Both Johnson (with civil rights) and Moses (with public works) accomplished what people said couldn't be done.
Caro clarifies he doesn't want someone as ruthless and disregarding of public opinion as Moses, but does need someone who finds a way to get things built despite opposition. When people claim everything Moses did was bad, Caro responds they didn't read the book.
The early Moses was a young idealist who wanted to make beaches accessible to New York City residents. He was an expert in civil service technicalities, working to reform the system so people got promoted on merit rather than political pull. The book traces how this idealistic young man evolved into someone who wanted to build regardless of opposition, evicting thousands without relocation provisions for projects like the Cross Bronx Expressway.
The Power Broker tells the story of how giving someone power hardens them to opposition. Caro interviewed Moses seven times while Moses was losing power. During early interviews at the Triborough Bridge Authority, Caro observed people waiting outside for decisions and a secretary bringing lists of telephone calls. By his final interview, there were no calls waiting.
In 1962, Moses tried his usual trick of threatening to resign if he didn't get his way with Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller accepted the resignation, and nothing happened. Previous governors and mayors couldn't fire Moses because he was too popular and had created an interlocking web of positions with different terms - chairman of the State Power Authority, chairman of Triborough Bridge Authority, Parks Commissioner, Long Island Parks Commissioner, Jones Beach Commissioner - making it nearly impossible to remove him from everything simultaneously.
After seven interviews, Caro asked Moses about a donation made to his commission by a millionaire whose golf course was spared by a new parkway route. Moses stopped talking to Caro afterward. If he could have had an eighth interview, Caro would have asked: "Did you realize you were changing?"
Caro believes Moses never realized he was changing. From the beginning, Moses felt he had a vision to build roads and parks that was the best thing to do and should get done regardless of hardships inflicted on people or thousands evicted.
Example of Increasing Ruthlessness
When Bronx politician Henry Epstein opposed the Cross Bronx Expressway and suggested moving it two blocks south to evict only a couple hundred instead of tens of thousands of people, Moses set out to destroy Epstein by making public his affair.
The Great Depression played a significant role in Moses' early achievements. Thousands of out-of-work architects lined up on Fifth Avenue that Moses could hire for very low wages. He could hire and fire workmen ruthlessly because they had no other jobs to go to during the Depression.
Earlier buildings like Grand Central Station featured beautiful architecture despite being built by a much poorer country. Caro explains that builders could hire skilled artisans at such low wages they could afford elaborate stonework decorations on upper floors that nobody would see, because "people came cheap."
Behind Johnson's persuasion was power. When Johnson asked something of a senator, the senator knew Johnson had power to give or deny committee assignments, pass or block specific laws. When Johnson put his arm around someone and leaned in, it wasn't just personality - behind it was the knowledge he could do things to or for them.
In Means of Ascent, about the 1948 Senate election against Coke Stevenson (called "Mr. Texas"), Caro paints a compelling portrait of the Texas governor. When asked if he wished Stevenson had won while writing the book, Caro began to respond that you couldn't help feeling...
Robert Caro explains his admiration for Coke Stevenson, who lost the 1948 Texas Senate election to Lyndon Johnson. Stevenson was both an idealist and someone who knew how to get things done during his time as governor of Texas. Caro notes that Stevenson would have been a great senator if he had won, and expresses regret over the manner of his defeat. The tragedy was compounded by Stevenson's failure to anticipate the tactics Johnson would employ in the election.
Caro addresses the hypothetical of Kennedy winning in 1960 while Johnson remains Senate majority leader instead of becoming vice president. The question is whether the landmark legislation of 1963-1965 would have passed earlier under Johnson's leadership in the Senate. Caro answers no, because Kennedy lacked the overriding vision and determination to transform America that defined Johnson's approach.
Johnson's unique quality was his determination to change America, rooted in his experience teaching poor children in Cotulla. This experience drove him to reform the education system and create programs to help poor people. This vision resulted in the civil rights laws and anti-poverty legislation that would not have existed without Johnson's presidency. Caro describes this determination as almost unique among presidents.
When Johnson's attention shifted to Vietnam, his domestic agenda collapsed. The programs he initiated—education laws and anti-poverty bills—did not achieve the full scope he intended. Caro identifies this as the great tragedy of Johnson's presidency: the contrast between his domestic achievements and the foreign policy failures that destroyed his administration.
Both Johnson and Robert Moses possessed inexhaustible energy, often working 16-hour days or longer. Caro attributes this to their extraordinary will rather than physical constitution. He describes Johnson making phone calls at 2:00 and 3:00 in the morning to secure votes. A senator once told Johnson during a 5:00 AM call that he had been "lying here waiting for your call," illustrating how Johnson's relentless pursuit of objectives defined his approach.
Caro addresses the challenge of writing books over 5-10 years with minimal external feedback during the process. His solution is to define the book's purpose before beginning. He learned this approach after The Power Broker, when he failed to establish a clear thesis upfront. Before starting each book, he sits at his desk asking "What is this book about?" until he can express it in one sentence or at most a paragraph.
Modern digital archives and internet resources have made research faster for Caro's current work on Vietnam. For example, he could locate oral histories and documents from the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley that would have been much harder to find previously. However, Caro states this would not have fundamentally changed his earlier volumes. While documents could be found faster, the time-intensive work of actually reading them remains unchanged.
Caro reflects on how his younger self would have reacted to learning that his Johnson biography would span more than 40 years. He provides context about The Power Broker, where he submitted a 1,050,000-word manuscript that had to be cut to approximately 700,000 words. His editor Bob Gottlieb cut 350,000 words, including material Gottlieb later described as "the best stuff I ever read."
Despite knowing that much of his research would be cut, Caro cannot stop himself from writing everything he believes should be included. He describes this as an inability to avoid thoroughness even when he knows substantial portions will be removed from the final manuscript.
Caro donated his extensive archives to the New-York Historical Society rather than accepting higher offers from other institutions. He chose this location for accessibility, preferring New York over the University of Texas. The archives contain hundreds of interviews—including 700 interviews for The Power Broker alone—with detailed typed notes that were never published.
Caro expresses regret over material that never made it into his books. He cites Sam Rayburn as an example—a major figure who ran the House of Representatives and passed many of Roosevelt's bills, yet lacks a good biography. The research material exists in his file cabinets but remains largely unknown to the public.
Caro conducted extensive interviews with senators and their assistants to understand Senate operations, but most of this material was cut or never written. He estimates that the vast majority of what he learned about the Senate is not in his published books but remains in his file cabinets.
Even without Johnson's presidency, the story of the Hill Country would be historically significant. Caro describes the frontier experience of Johnson's ancestors settling in what was essentially Indian country, facing potential massacre and extreme isolation. The loneliness of this life shaped the character of those who experienced it.
Johnson grew up on the Johnson Ranch, 18 miles beyond Johnson City. Caro interviewed elderly residents who described driving 22 miles from Austin without passing another house. This isolation formed a fundamental part of Johnson's character and worldview, creating a stark contrast with the America he would later lead in the 1960s.
Caro describes the profound isolation of his writing process. He turns off his phone each morning and works without speaking to anyone all day. While he considers himself a friendly person, the need for concentration prevents casual conversation. This isolation affects his relationships, as friends must understand that he won't return calls until the end of the day, and many people don't comprehend this requirement.
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