Democrats vs Republicans: Who Is Actually More Violent? - Robert Pape
In a Nutshell
Robert Pape's research shows that support for political violence has reached unprecedented levels in America, with 25% of adults (65 million) now backing force to stop Trump from becoming president and 16% supporting Trump using the military against Democratic protesters—totaling roughly 100 million Americans. The core drivers are America's demographic shift from white majority to white minority democracy and the top 1% gaining wealth at everyone else's expense, creating zero-sum fears that whoever wins elections will eliminate benefits for the losing side. This has produced an era of violent populism on both left and right that makes the 2026 midterms the most dangerous elections in modern American history.
These notes were generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies.
Robert Pape states that the number one threat to America is not from a foreign government or fringe militia groups, but from tens of millions of Americans who support political violence. Once support for political violence becomes lodged in the mainstream of society, this changes everything. Pape describes this as a new era called violent populism, distinct from the historical pattern of occasional political violence that has occurred almost every year since America's founding 250 years ago.
The Civil War occurred in 1860, which Americans consider a long time ago. The 1960s Vietnam War protests represent another historical period of unrest, but occurred over 65 years ago. Pape notes he is at the tail end of the baby boom generation and cannot personally recall the 1960s due to being too young. While there have been previous eras of violent populism with assassination attempts, violent protests, and millions supporting political violence, the current situation is a historical anomaly and not the same as 10 or 15 years ago.
The United States has experienced three assassination attempts against Donald Trump: two when he was running for president and one when he was president. These represent only a small number of many assassination attempts and assassinations over the last 5 years. Additional incidents include:
- The assassination attempt against Nancy Pelosi that missed her but nearly killed her husband
- The attempt against Brett Kavanaugh, a US Supreme Court justice
- The arson attack on Josh Shapiro's house while his family was sleeping, occurring just a year and two days prior to September 12, 2025
- The assassination of Charlie Kirk on September 10, 2025, while he was debating on a college campus
During the summer of 2020 George Floyd protests, while most were peaceful, 5 to 7% were not. With 28 million Americans engaged in protesting, this represents a large number of violent incidents. January 6 is also mentioned as part of this pattern of political violence.
Ordinary populism involves political polarization and peaceful protest where millions are upset about the establishment locking them out of benefits. This can be completely peaceful and generate changes of political parties or bring new people into politics. Violent populism transforms this anger into political violent anger with support for political violence that encourages actual political violence.
The University of Chicago Project on Security and Threats has conducted 20 national surveys over 5.5 years, with the 21st survey completed 10 days prior to this interview. The most recent survey data reveals alarming numbers for the upcoming midterms. Pape describes an "America's domestic escalation trap" where whoever loses the midterms will likely see violent protests potentially larger than January 6.
When asked about supporting political violence to remove President Trump from the presidency or prevent him from being president, support has risen dramatically:
- Several years ago: 6-9% of Americans supported anti-Trump political violence
- September 2025 (before Charlie Kirk's assassination): 14% (over 30 million Americans)
- Most recent survey: 25% of American adults support the use of force to prevent Trump from being president (65 million American adults)
This 25% figure represents 44% of self-identified Democrats. Focus groups and survey experiments reveal that 55% of those supporting "the use of force" mean assassinating President Trump with rifles, similar to the Butler attempt.
Regarding support for President Trump using the US military to suppress Democratic protesters, 16% of Americans support this action, almost all of them Republican, equating to approximately 40 million Americans. Combining both anti-Trump and pro-Trump support for political violence yields 100 million Americans supporting political violence heading into the midterms.
Pape predicts the midterms will be the most dangerous elections in Americans' lifetimes, not just on election day but involving the counting of votes and certifying the winner in Congress on January 6, 2027. The actual violence related to the 2020 election occurred on January 6, 2021, when Congress was certifying the winner, not on election day.
Studies claiming the greatest domestic threat comes from the right were accurate until 10 years ago. When examining annual data point by point, studies claiming violence comes from either the right or left reach almost identical conclusions. The disagreement stems from different starting points: studies beginning in 1990 show majority right-wing lone wolf violence over 35 years, while studies starting in 2015 show violence heavily balanced between left and right.
The nature of political violence has changed over the last 10 years. The current era of violent populism dates to the beginning of Trump's first term. Much of the violence since then is either pro-Trump or anti-anti-Trump, representing reactionary and re-reactionary responses to social changes Trump both represents and causes.
The era of violent populism stems from being at the tipping point of certain social changes occurring in America. Trump is both a symptom and cause of these changes. Understanding these deeper social changes explains why the current situation exists and why it may worsen over the next 5 to 10 years.
Pape has studied perpetrators of political violence on both sides, including the three would-be assassins of Trump, Luigi Mangione, and the assassin who killed Hortman and her husband in Minnesota. Drawing from 20 years studying terrorism and compiling over 8,000 suicide terrorist attacks worldwide after 9/11, he finds symmetry between right and left in basic operations and how they relate to mass support for political violence.
Mass support for political violence fundamentally changes the scale of violence expected. This pattern appears in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 80s, and in Lebanon during other periods. Mass support nudges volatile individuals over the edge by providing an additional motive of social approval for carrying out violence.
Social media acts like pouring gasoline on an underlying fire. The social approval for violence can be seen almost instantly through these platforms. When examining collective political violence rather than individual assassins, three main instances have occurred since summer 2020.
The University of Chicago Project on Security and Threats tracked protests daily in the top 50 cities throughout summer 2020. While most protests were peaceful, a clear pattern emerged: peaceful protests would start around 1:00 PM in downtown areas and continue through early evening. When protest conveners wanted people to go home, most did, but those who stayed engaged in violence after sunset. This resulted in 20-25 million Americans legitimately experiencing only peaceful protests because they went home, while splinter groups burned police stations and destroyed businesses.
January 6 followed the same 5-7% rule as George Floyd protests. Trump called the crowd weeks before with his December 19th tweet stating "come January 6, it will be wild." Approximately 120,000 people gathered at the Ellipse to hear Trump and others speak. During his speech, Trump pushed up the crowd's energy by reciting state-by-state evidence of election theft and focusing attention on weak Republicans in Congress, specifically naming Mitch McConnell and expressing concern about Mike Pence stopping the certification. Trump stated the crowd would march to the Capitol with him at the head to demand the right result. Within 15 minutes of his speech, people began moving toward the Capitol, with 10,000 people bursting through bike fence perimeters defended by 200 police officers.
The crowd grew to 10,000 people who moved from the Ellipse to surround the Capitol, breaking through three perimeters of bike fences defended by only 200 police officers. At approximately 2:15 when Mike Pence formally certified the election, Trump posted that "Mike Pence let us down," which coincided with the crowd bursting through the Capitol doors and windows. The "Hang Mike Pence" chants and scaffolding construction occurred during this period.
Of the 120,000 total attendees at the Ellipse, 10,000 surrounded the Capitol, but only 1,600 actually committed the violent acts of breaking through windows and doors. An additional 400 individuals entered afterward and wandered through looking at things, but these were not included in the 1,600 prosecuted individuals. The 1,600 used flag poles and bike racks as weapons to beat police officers, with photographic evidence showing 600 of these individuals actively assaulting officers.
For approximately three hours, President Trump took no action to call off the rioters until making a video at 4:15 saying they should go home while expressing love for what they did. Since then, Trump has pardoned all 1,600 individuals (exactly 1,575), regardless of their level of violence. The research center conducted case-by-case analysis of all 1,575 prosecutions, reviewing over 10,000 court documents.
January 6th radicalized much of the MAGA movement, transforming it from what it was before to what it has become. Trump continues posting on Truth Social videos of his January 6 speech, reminding supporters that it was "a good thing." When asked about the percentage of violence, approximately 8-10% of the 10,000 surrounding the Capitol engaged in violent acts, with the 1,600 representing an even smaller fraction of the total attendees.
Nearly 200 police officers required hospital treatment, and five committed suicide afterward. The speaker notes that if police had chosen to stand and fight to prevent entry rather than allowing the initial breach, many more than 1,600 might have entered the building, suggesting the event could have been significantly worse with greater resistance.
From October 7, 2023 through spring 2024, nearly an entire year of violent protests occurred on college campuses. Large-scale surveys were conducted of over 5,000 college undergraduates and 5,000 ordinary adults during this period. These campus protests represented a similar "wildfire" phenomenon to the George Floyd protests, though less violent in terms of property damage. Students reported being scared during the protests, particularly regarding fears of violence spreading into classrooms and libraries.
The current period represents an "era of violent populism" occurring on both the political right and left, distinguishing it from the 1960s (primarily left-wing violence) and 1920s (primarily right-wing violence). Both sides resist acknowledging violence on their own side, preferring to point fingers at the opposition. Media coverage follows predictable patterns where right-wing attacks are attributed to mental illness by left-leaning media, and left-wing attacks receive similar treatment from right-leaning media.
The traditional stereotype of political violence supporters being unemployed, rural, militia-affiliated males aged 18-25 was accurate from 1990-2015 but changed significantly under Trump and especially after January 6. The new profile includes well-educated, middle-class Americans with nice homes, 401k accounts, and professional careers who wear suits and ties. Examples include Luigi Mangione from generational wealth who attended prep schools and Ivy League institutions, and Cole Allen, a 31-year-old highly educated engineer who authored a manifesto about responding to social injustices under the Trump administration.
Of the 1,575 January 6 defendants, 45% were business owners, doctors, gynecologists, or nurse practitioners. Only 10% were militia group members. The defendants came from nice suburbs around major cities like Dallas and Austin, Texas, rather than rural areas. Detailed background information was collected through the court system and FBI investigations, providing high confidence in these demographic profiles.
People with careers, families, houses, and education risk everything because they believe they are about to lose it all in the coming years. Both sides fear that when the opposition wins, benefits will be "zeroed out" for their side. The East Palestine, Ohio train derailment disaster exemplifies this concern, where MAGA country residents felt Democratic leaders showed insufficient sympathy, while Democrats fear Republicans will eliminate birthright citizenship.
Radicalization occurs through group dynamics rather than individual transformation. The "wildfire" analogy describes how initially peaceful crowds escalate into violence over hours. Support for political violence represents a "normalization" process that cascades unless political leaders actively push back against it. Approximately 65-70% of Americans abhor political violence but remain a "silent majority" without effective vehicles to express this view.
Political violence requires both combustible material (normalized support) and a focal point or trigger (the "cigar butt") to ignite action. January 6 demonstrated this pattern with months of election fraud claims building tension until Trump's speech provided the spark. Support for political violence does not automatically translate to action without such focal points, though those who support violence are more likely to participate when triggers occur.
The speaker notes that perpetrators of political violence cannot normally be interviewed directly, but sometimes their actions provide equivalent insight. The individual who attacked Pelosi
The Paul Pelosi attacker was arrested and jailed in San Francisco. Ten days later, a local radio station conducted an interview with him still available online. The first thing he expressed was an apology to people across the country for failing to kill Nancy Pelosi. He stated that he knew they wanted her dead and that he had the opportunity but failed in the attempt.
This case demonstrates a true believer who is committed not only to the cause but to generating publicity for it. Another example involves Cole Allen, the third attacker targeting Trump just before the dinner incident. Allen sent a manifesto to friends and family members explicitly stating he viewed himself as a social justice warrior and Robin Hood figure making personal sacrifices to achieve outcomes that others wanted but would not pursue themselves.
Manifestos serve to connect the perpetrator with their perceived supportive community. They explain why the action was taken and embrace the affinity between the violence and what the community values. Manifestos also typically include personal apologies to loved ones for not being around anymore, such as a son apologizing to his mother that he will not be there to help her in old age.
When asked whether the main problem is violent extremists or people who sympathize with them, the answer is the people who sympathize with them by far. This may be surprising and uncomfortable for people to hear. Joking at the office coffee maker about giving Trump assassins better shooter training constitutes support for political violence.
When there is mass support for political violence, it translates into actual political violence. Historical examples demonstrate this pattern. In Northern Ireland, the Irish Republican Army conducted decades of terrorism. Public support for political violence among Catholics grew in the fall of 1969 according to opinion poll data, and this gave birth to the IRA rather than the other way around.
In the 1960s, the Weather Underground formed from anti-war protesters and conducted over 20 bombings to protest the Vietnam War. They wrote books detailing how they perceived huge community support for their actions. After approximately 20 bombings, they expressed surprise that more people were not following in their wake. They were disappointed that support for their actual violence was not as substantial as expected. One reason they eventually went out of business was that there simply were not many takers for that violence.
Violent populism is not exclusively happening in America. The trend is beginning in other mature democracies including Canada, Germany, Britain, and France. In Germany around the time of January 6, there was a similar storming of the Reichstag in Berlin. The German chancellor flew Professor Pape to Berlin in September 2022 for an entire week of meetings in the chancellery with every single top leader of the CDU party, including the defense minister, as well as leaders of other parties including the Green Party. This analysis reportedly played a powerful role in rolling up a plot to assassinate the chancellor six weeks later.
Pape has also worked with the Canadian and British governments because the social changes underlying violent populism in the United States are occurring in other mature Western democracies with a slight lag.
The biggest driver is demographic shift. For the first time in America's 250-year history, the United States is transitioning from a white majority democracy to a white minority democracy. In 1990, the population was 76% non-Hispanic white. Today it is 57% non-Hispanic white. In approximately 15 to 20 years, depending on deportations, it will be 49% non-Hispanic white. This demographic shift has tremendous political importance because it dramatically impacts which political parties will win elections.
The Republican Party is much more heavily white than the Democratic Party. This explains the meteoric rise of President Trump on the issue of immigration. When Trump came down the escalator in 2015 and talked about immigration, he almost instantly rose to the top and knocked out other Republican leaders who were on the other side of the immigration issue. For a large fraction of Trump voters, Trump represents stopping or reversing this demographic shift.
Many on the left see the rise of Trump, the MAGA movement, and immigration restrictions as threats to continuing the demographic shift, and they want to accelerate it. Survey data shows that people worried that whites in America are being deliberately replaced by the Democratic Party are four times more likely to support political violence for Trump. People who believe America is a racist country and always has been are two and a half times more likely to support political violence against Trump.
The second social driver is a mass wealth shift to the top 1%. This began in the late 1980s when the top 1% controlled about 17% of America's wealth. Today they control 26%. This means the bottom has lost that money. When buying a house or paying rent, people have been experiencing a negative trajectory over the last 30 years, losing ground compared to their parents. This creates a negative society where people are economically worse off with each passing year.
Those who have are worried they will have less and less. This combines with the demographic shift because people worry that if the other party gets in power, they will help their own and take even more. Both sides think this. The focal point for these concerns is an election.
Stage one involves the actual vote and outcome producing a legitimacy shock in the form of a razor-thin margin where losers do not think they legitimately lost. Stage two is the focal point of seating Congress on January 6, where losers may not accept the outcome. Stage three, if stage two produces another January 6-style event, involves prolonged violent opposition.
Pape is easily more than 50% worried about the midterms. The situation is way too dangerous. In June 2025, following the Hortman assassination, Pape published a New York Times piece warning that America was on the brink of a period of major political violence. He warned about assassination attempts against people on the right and President Trump using military-style immigration enforcement in cities like Chicago and Minneapolis. Three months later, the Charlie Kirk assassination, Operation Midway Blitz in Chicago, and Metro Blitz in Minneapolis all occurred.
Sentiments supporting political violence are much higher now. The most dangerous elections in our lifetimes are approaching, and there are no signs of pushback by political leaders. Leaders are happy to call out violence by the other side but will not restrain their own constituents.
The situation would not necessarily be better if Democrats had won in 2024 because the problem is a function of the two social changes rather than which party holds power. Both parties are happy to restrain the other side's billionaires but show no demonstrated evidence of reversing the wealth shift to their own billionaires.
In fall 2022, Pape warned key authorities about the rise of possible assassination attempts against Democratic leaders, and the Pelosi attack happened just a few weeks later. Pape has advised every White House since 2001, both Democratic and Republican. The pattern involves conducting surveys tracking sentiment and support for political violence, taking it seriously based on knowledge of political violence worldwide, and issuing warnings when sentiments rise on one side. This includes warnings to national sheriff's associations and political leaders in Washington DC.
The best studies on foreign manipulation were conducted at the University of Cambridge in the aftermath of Trump's 2016 victory. Russia had an internet research agency in St. Petersburg dedicated to influencing and polarizing American attitudes on social media. The Cambridge scholars found that foreign manipulation appears to have been modest—not trivial but not overwhelming. Foreign governments can magnify existing issues of violent populism and social change by approximately 10 or 20%, but it does not appear possible to make them up out of whole cloth.
Pape states that America is its own worst enemy rather than being primarily driven by China or Russia manipulation because testing in a social scientific way shows relatively modest effects on moving the needle.
Iran created hundreds of Lego videos showing President Trump falling down, slipping on banana peels, and being thrown out of meetings by allies. These state-sponsored videos were designed to embarrass Trump and manipulate American public opinion against the Iran war.
Recent surveys conducted less than two weeks prior showed support for the Iran war divided along preexisting cleavages of violent populism rather than reflecting foreign propaganda influence. The data revealed that war support followed established domestic political divisions.
Every war since World War II produced a rally around the flag effect where the public deferred to the president on foreign policy decisions regardless of party. This phenomenon occurred consistently for seven decades across multiple administrations. The Iran war represents the first instance where this effect failed to materialize.
Iran's propaganda efforts showed no evidence of moving the key MAGA constituency needed to shift Trump's position on the war. Foreign powers cannot simply fabricate narratives to reverse American public opinion 180 degrees. Even moderate influence from foreign powers on public opinion is substantially less than commonly assumed.
Russia and China benefit most from American internal conflict because domestic divisions consume attention and lead to poor international decision-making. The phrase "a house divided" describes how internal focus reduces capacity to address foreign affairs effectively.
The White House prioritizes domestic political issues that resonate with ordinary voters over international concerns. Issues like the ballroom matter to low propensity voters who respond to tangible, understandable concerns. Trump's approach reflects his understanding that these voters form his key electoral base.
Trump demonstrates exceptional political skill in identifying and addressing concerns of his base. He may be the most brilliant politician since Ronald Reagan in terms of voter mobilization and understanding what matters to ordinary Americans.
Trump understands that his supporters care about symbolic naming conventions like the Gulf of America, demonstrating his grasp of low-propensity voter priorities that mainstream media often dismisses as trivial.
Social changes account for approximately 50% of current civil unrest, President Trump contributes 25%, and social media plus other factors comprise the remaining 25%. Both Trump supporters and opponents tend to exaggerate Trump's influence while underestimating the role of underlying social transformations.
Focus groups reveal that parents worry more about their children's social media consumption than their own. This leads to overemphasis on social media as a driver of political violence compared to deeper structural factors.
Lebanon's decades of civil wars stem from deep demographic problems rather than individual leaders. Israel faces similar demographic tensions between religious and secular populations. Social changes drive political violence across societies regardless of specific leadership.
In 2022, major media organizations debated Pape's analysis of January 6th participants, with editorial boards arguing that deplatforming Trump and Tucker Carlson would reduce political violence. These same organizations later published Pape's work after deplatforming efforts failed to diminish the underlying drivers of unrest.
Mamdani represents the Democratic equivalent of Trump - a previously unknown figure who achieved meteoric political rise by focusing on social change issues. Both politicians built rapid national profiles around existential political questions rather than incremental policy differences like tax rates.
The key issues driving American political division involve fundamental social changes rather than traditional policy disagreements. These existential political questions are breaking the country apart and fueling the era of violent populism. New politicians emerge as household names within nine months by centering these transformative social issues.
Pape directs viewers to his new YouTube channel "Paper on the Politics of Force" started two weeks prior, his Substack "The Escalation Trap" focusing on domestic escalation dynamics, and his book available on Amazon containing extensive additional content.
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