WW3 DEBATE: “We’re On the Brink of Global Collapse”
In a Nutshell
The U.S. is driving global instability through internal divisions and overreach while trying to disengage from world leadership, creating interconnected regional conflicts that are wrecking the global economy. America's refusal to cede hegemony combined with domestic political violence and economic vulnerabilities is accelerating a shift from Pax Americana to a fragmented, war-prone world order. China is positioned to gain from this transition due to its industrial dominance and self-sufficiency, while the U.S. risks losing its global position through strategic miscalculations and failure to address internal crises.
These notes were generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies.
The biggest threat to global peace is internal divisions in the United States. These divisions have been building for the last 5 years and are normalizing political violence. This has led to the rise of leaders who find the use of political violence increasingly normal, which led to the Iran war. The United States is the most important and powerful country on the planet, and what happens internally can have ripple effects around the world.
The United States is the greatest threat to global peace because for the past 30 years Pax Americana has been dominant. With the rise of other powers, the United States refuses to cede its global hegemony, which is why conflicts are occurring around the world, specifically in the Middle East. Rather than a global conflict like nuclear war between the United States and Russia, the current situation involves various smaller regional conflicts. The global system that existed during the European imperial age or after World War II is restructuring itself.
Multiple regional conflicts are linked in some ways and together are wrecking the global economy. These conflicts are having a major effect on the global economy, including the Russia-Ukraine war and the Iran conflict. If a conflict with Taiwan and China occurs on top of existing conflicts, even if they remain separate arenas, the world might be heading to something far worse than a 1930s depression. These conflicts are already having global consequences in ways not seen since World War II, unlike the Vietnam War or the forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The United States unilaterally attacked Iran without reason, starting the war in the Middle East that is threatening to destroy the global economy. The war in Ukraine can also be blamed on the United States because in 2022, Putin and Zelensky would have come to an agreement, but Boris Johnson flew into Kiev and convinced Zelensky to fight. In Southeast Asia, the United States is withdrawing, but Japan is being remilitarized with United States support.
The National Defense Strategy published by the Pentagon earlier this year calls for the United States withdrawing from the global stage and creating a balance of power in each different region: Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The United States is intent on maintaining its global hegemony but recognizes it doesn't have the military power or political will to control the entire world as it did during Pax Americana. It is offloading responsibilities to regional allies: NATO in Europe, Israel and the GCC in the Middle East, and Japan in Southeast Asia.
American decisions have been at the taproot of both the war with Russia and Ukraine and the Iran war. These decisions are a function of decisions and decision makers evolving given internal divisions in the country. For the last 10 years, there has been an incredible rise of political violence in the United States driven by major social changes: the shift from a white majority democracy to a white minority democracy for the first time in 250-year history, and the shift of massive wealth to the top 1% over the last several decades.
The United States is now seeing leaders that find political violence normal, including President Trump in both his first and second terms, and some Democratic leaders. Due to internal problems, there has not been sufficient attention to the consequences of global decisions. There has been insufficient attention to issues with Russia and Ukraine, and issues with Iran. The decision to continue supporting NATO expansion and make Ukraine a much stronger country even after Putin took Crimea in 2014 was made without serious attention to consequences.
America is not losing its grip as a world superpower; it wants to lose it. The past 80 years have not been a happy time for the United States. The fundamental principle has been command of the sea from a long time. Keeping enemies away from Atlantic ports was essential. This drew the United States into creating NATO, creating an economic system based on Bretton Woods, and other arrangements that put tremendous pressure on the American economy.
The United States is pulling back from its vulnerability to the world and not engaging it. The world is not seeing it that way because the Cold War ended in Ukraine, and the Russian army could not take Ukraine after five years. The Cold War is obsolete, and the American desire to disengage was predictable. The United States is not increasing its power around the world but trying to remove its vulnerability from the world, and the world feels betrayed.
Currently, America is 26% of the world's GDP while China is 17% of the world's GDP. Looking out 20 years, China has a tremendous advantage going forward. A big development over the last 20 years is that America is losing the next industrial advance and the next economic revolution to China, and Americans are not even noticing it very much.
In June of 2025, while America was bombing Iran, two weeks were spent in China touring advanced industries in Beijing, Wuhan, Hangzhou, and Shenzhen. The trip revealed not just the uplifting of individual companies but whole cities. Wuhan and other cities have been completely uplifted. This includes the advanced sector, healthcare sector, and construction sector. The media is only getting 10% of what's happening inside China. The area from Wuhan to Shenzhen covers approximately 50 million people, comparable to the American rust belt from Chicago to Pittsburgh to St. Louis.
China has integrated education with industry. Universities are tightly producing BAs, MAs, and PhDs. China has uplifted entire regions of 50 million people in 10 or 12 years, with roots in the 1990s. China's cities are in marvelous shape, particularly the coastal areas and South China, but the rural areas are profoundly important.
China is the second largest economy in the world, but in terms of per capita income, it is 71st. The fundamental problem is that China cannot consume the products it produces. Xi recently announced a plan to make more domestic demand possible in rural regions, which are very different from coastal regions. China is dependent on exports, with the United States being the largest importer of Chinese goods.
The United States was the China of the 19th century. After the Civil War, there was an industrial rising that was heavily dependent on exports to Europe. The United States has constantly and dynamically evolved through tension, having deep divisions but somehow managing them. The tensions within the United States are not unprecedented; the country survived the Civil War.
China is vulnerable because it depends on exports. If other economies falter or cannot buy Chinese goods, or if there is a political shift, China gets into trouble because it must have access to the global market the same way the United States had to in the early part of its development. The difference between coastal regions of South China and the interior led to Mao's revolution, and this problem was never solved.
George mentions the vulnerability of American empire and the US dollar as a global reserve currency. The American people do not want this system because the world can become a parasite on America. If America has a global reserve currency, then America's capital markets are completely free and open and liberal, which cannot control capital flows and caused tremendous problems including wealth inequality and financialization that hollowed out American manufacturing.
America needs to guarantee global peace and security, which is why its army is spread throughout the world and why the Pentagon budget is a trillion dollars a year. The United States assumes a lot of cost. Wall Street benefits from this arrangement because of financialization, and the Chinese Communist Party also benefits because China is an export-dependent economy. Chinese ships export goods to Europe, the Middle East, and the United States protected by the US Navy, not the Chinese Navy. China doesn't even have a blue water navy. When Chinese trade occurs, it is through the US dollar.
China is completely dependent on Pax Americana. The idea that as Pax Americana is falling, China will rise makes no sense. China lacks domestic consumption power because its people do not have money. All the rich people are going to the United States. China has a huge demographic problem where it is aging rapidly because of the one child policy. China has no workforce, which is why China is spending everything on robotics, semiconductors, and AI.
The United States is a self-sufficient, resource-rich economy with a very vibrant, energetic, young population. China has the opposite problem: it is extremely export-oriented, a very poor country with very limited resources, and very dependent on global supply chains. Global supply chains are currently breaking down.
In 2015, the same pessimistic view of China was held. Since 2017, when Trump tariffs were first put on China, there has been a dramatic emphasis to disengage the development of the next generation of industries from America. BYD vehicles cannot be bought in the United States, and Xiaomi's next-level products are not being sold in the United States. China's growth model is built around Asia, not Europe or the United States. The top executives explained that the more the United States gets sucked into a quagmire with Iran, China will run into some short-term problems but will jettison ahead, just like after COVID.
Chinese growth rate is down to a little over 4%, previously 5%, and was 15%. This is the wrong measure. It would be like measuring America's growth rate without noticing electrification in the 1880s. America has been great because since 1880, it has led every technological revolution. The AI revolution is currently happening, and the stock market is betting America will come out ahead, but China is building the core infrastructure to be able to beat America.
Japan is remilitarizing rapidly and building an alliance with India, the Philippines, and Australia called the Quad. In the long term, the intention is to embargo China and cut off supply chains with India, Indonesia, and others. From Japan all the way to India, there is at sea a blockade. China's response to this possible embargo needs to be considered, particularly regarding President Xi's question to President Trump about whether America would fight if there is a conflict between China and Taiwan.
If the United States is removed from the equation, the competition becomes fundamentally different between the Quad and China. The Quad and China might decide to fight each other, with both sides going down, but this would not be a sure winner for the Quad over China. This scenario is not China provoking war, but rather outsiders attacking China. Mao's revolution was a gigantic revolution inside China against foreign conquest, not about unifying China.
The Taiwan situation has profoundly changed inside Taiwan. The population is divided almost down the middle, with the KMT favoring reuniting with China in some way, representing about half the population. The other half is very much opposed to reunification. From the Chinese point of view, Taiwan was a great danger because between Japan and the Philippines, Taiwan served as a blocking force in the first island chain. China wants Taiwan opened.
The United States does not have a fundamental interest in Taiwan. Xi is coming to the United States with stated plans to reach many great agreements. A forecast indicates that this year China and the United States would come to a fundamental understanding. China must have that understanding because the United States is China's number one trading partner and the only military threat to China. Accommodation is rational for China, and these talks have been taking place. China shows tremendous political system instability while the economic system moves ahead properly.
China has a fundamental problem because it must have a decent relationship with the United States, but the United States has stated it cannot be dependent on China for imports if war is also possible. This mirrors the 1970s Arab oil embargo disaster when dependence on the Arabs proved unsustainable during conflict.
The suggestion is that the US and China will become friends soon. The response clarifies they will not be friends or lovers, but simply need each other. When in China, talks were given arguing that China can rise peacefully with the United States. This position stems from examining the growth of power today, which is modernization and technological development.
With drones and experiences with Iran, the United States is not losing because of Iran's 4% capability but because of being behind in understanding the second precision revolution. Others are evolving while the assumption that the United States remains on the cutting edge of everything is being challenged. This does not mean going to war against China.
President Xi asked Trump about the Thucydides trap and whether they were going to war. These are the right questions. War with China is not inevitable if smart choices are made: developing the industrial base and modernizing internally.
The question of whether the United States will be replaced as the world's number one power in 20 years is a choice. If the US keeps fighting quagmires and fails to develop internally or catch up to China, the answer is yes. The United States is the only global power, while China is a regional power that cannot project force into the Atlantic, which the US can do. This does not mean the United States is in fundamental decline.
Three dimensions of global power determine who will be number one. The first is GDP as a fraction of world product: the US is currently at 26%, China at 17%, but this could flip-flop in 20 years. The second is allies and how many friends a country has. With tariffs and tensions with Canada, friends are being alienated during the war with Iran, and China is likely to pick up those friends.
The third dimension is the technological base and growth. If the world economy goes over a cliff with $40 trillion in debt, the question becomes whether investment can solve this through AI.
The past 30-40 years of Pax Americana have been unique in human history. Never before had a power span the entire globe with a global reserve currency for the first time. Never before had one nation dictated the global economy. Pax Americana is reverting back to the mean of more regional dominance.
Three basic criteria examine how nation states thrive or die. The first is energy: how hardworking are the people. The second is openness: how open people are to change and willing to absorb new ideas. The third is cohesion: how much people value their own neighbors.
Using these three metrics, regional dominance emerges. In East Asia, Japan will dominate, not China. In Europe, either Germany or Poland will dominate, with Germany more powerful but Poland more cohesive. In North America, the United States dominates by far and could face plant its way through the next few decades and still remain dominant. In the Middle East, Israel is most dominant.
The US's ability to put both feet in its mouth and continue being a preeminent power helps smooth over cracks, inefficiencies, and instabilities. The momentum and sheer size mean issues can burble below the surface for a while before the lid gets lifted, potentially leading to civil unrest.
A book titled "Our Own Worst Enemies: America in the Age of Violent Populism" is coming out, available for pre-order on Amazon. Five years were spent studying this problem, examining where the biggest threat to America lies. After the George Floyd protests, with 28 million protesting and 7% involving riots and political violence, millions engaged in unrest. January 6th marked the first time in history a violent mob supported by the president tried to stop the constitutional process of changing presidential power.
Political assassinations and assassination attempts have risen. This period is akin to the 1960s, with violent populism on both the right and the left. Tens of millions of Americans on each side of the political spectrum support political violence for their goals, leading to support for aggressive ICE tactics against democratic protesters even after ICE kills those protesters.
The United States had a civil war that ripped itself apart and came together again. Most countries that experience civil war cannot accommodate themselves again. The United States is historically at each other's throats during various periods. This is one dimension of the United States as an invented country, with the constitution invented and the population invented. Americans constantly came together.
From the founding, the United States has been good at being deeply divided. John Adams said one-third of the people were for the revolution, one-third against, and one-third didn't care. The divisions are viewed differently than the perspective of inevitable civil war.
Surviving the Civil War is not sufficient justification because 600,000 people died. With $40 trillion in debt, the idea of having another civil war and getting out fine is problematic. After a civil war, the United States would not even be a regional power.
American history requires measuring the state of the country against something, otherwise there's a constant feeling that things have never been so terrible. A sense of proportion is needed. Between World War II isolationists and interventionists, America has constantly approached the world deeply divided. The revolution was not a joint universal uprising but deeply divided, with families moving to Canada.
Americans constantly feel they are going to hell and have the ability to tremendously overestimate weaknesses and underestimate tremendous strengths. The past serves as a measure of culture's flexibility and viability even under pressure.
The distinction is that civil war involves armies going toe-to-toe, while violent populism involves battle after battle. The future is more in danger of becoming like Turkey, where normalized political violence leads to the president absorbing more powers and hiding things. This happened during both Trump and Biden presidencies, with open borders under Biden bringing 10 million plus into the country while claiming nothing was happening at the border.
Political violence has become normal for tens of millions of Americans for the first time since the 1960s. This has consequences because it exists on both the right and the left. With the midterms approaching, people are terrified President Trump will seize ballot boxes because he said he would do that in February.
The best historical analogy for the United States is the Roman Empire. The critical turning point was around 150 BCE during the third Punic War, when Carthage was destroyed and became just an economic center, no longer a military power. There was debate in the Roman Senate about what to do with Carthage. Cato the Elder demanded destruction because Carthage would always be a threat. Others argued against destruction, warning that without an external enemy, Rome would tear itself apart.
Cato won, Carthage was destroyed, and complete civil strife followed. The social war starting around 100 BCE led to Julius Caesar, Augustus Caesar, and all sorts of wars.
The United States is probably the most violent country on the planet, with more guns per capita than people. America is the only nation to play football. Americans have tremendous energy that can be directed outwards toward conquering the world or, if not directed outwards, becomes directed inwards, leading to civil war, violent populism, or an emergency.
Domestic violence is almost unavoidable due to trends in place. The first trend is wealth inequality and financialization of society. The second major trend is gerontocracy and baby boomers monopolizing political power, economic wealth, and social status, leaving young people with no opportunity.
James B. Calhoun ran the rat utopia experiment in the 1960s, placing rats in paradise with no predators and free food every day. The rats turned against each other and killed each other. Young men strive for social status, and if denied the ability to climb the social hierarchy and find recognition, they turn violent as a matter of human nature.
The book is a product of five years of research at the Chicago Project on Security and Threats at the University of Chicago, involving 20 national surveys. Questions were asked about how worried people are they won't be as prosperous as their parents, addressing wealth inequality and social mobility. The more people think they won't be as prosperous as their parents, the more they support political violence on both the right and left.
Another major social change is the transition from a white majority democracy to a white minority democracy. Other countries have experienced political violence over this transition, such as Lebanon. This is happening in America for the first time. If people are unhappy with the transition and want to reverse it, they are far more likely to support political violence on right-wing issues. If they want to keep it going, they are more likely to support political violence on left-wing issues.
These reasons overlap with points about American divisions. Data from 20 national surveys confirms these patterns. A year ago, a New York Times op-ed warned about being on the brink of major political violence, followed by the Charlie Kirk assassination, Operation Midway Blitz, and Metro Blitz.
A year before that, data showed rising anger to the point of violence against President Trump. This was brought to the National Sheriff's Association in the last week of June 2024, warning of a non-trivial possibility of an assassination attempt against President Trump. The July 13th attempt followed.
Twenty years of modeling the Iran war led to predictions about what might come. Work on political violence examines not just the rearview mirror but gives real decision makers, including the chief of staff of the Air Force, West Wing of the White House, and FBI, strategic intelligence about where things are heading and where probabilities of future events are shifting.
The violent time is placed in context of American history and culture. Doing something never done before and recovered from is very different from something unprecedented. Culture and history are examined to assess whether the United States can handle current pressures.
The question arises whether current events represent something unprecedented or follow cyclical patterns that have occurred before. If it's truly unprecedented, radical shifts become possible. If it's part of a recurring cycle handled in the past, there's high probability of counteraction and subsidence. Historical perspective matters because events like the 1930s isolationist movement, which carried antisemitic elements and tensions, demonstrate that similar periods have been weathered before.
The Civil War represents the most extreme example of this type of crisis, and the country survived. The question isn't only whether a crisis is coming, but whether American culture has the capacity to withstand such crises. Even in the event of civil war, people would remain and a country could emerge afterward, as occurred following the Civil War with what may have been the most dynamic economic development in history.
The distinction matters between encountering a fever never experienced before versus another cold that shouldn't be taken as seriously. This framing places current events in the context of American nature, culture, and history. Historical patterns show that periods of extreme tension and violence eventually subsided, including the 1970s with its killings and kidnappings.
The research focuses not just on documenting 1960s violence but on understanding why it ended. The violence concluded for structural reasons rather than simply burning out. Two primary drivers fueled 1960s political violence. The first was massive black migration to the North and Midwest without corresponding political representation, leading to riots and Malcolm X's "ballot or the bullet" rhetoric. By the mid-1970s, the formation of the Black Caucus provided actual political representation, though imperfect, which reduced the underlying violence.
The second driver was the Vietnam War and conscription. The war's end wasn't the only factor—conscription ended in 1973, removing the structural pressure that had sustained the anti-war movement. This ended groups like the Weather Underground and Weathermen. The structural changes removed the steam from violent protest movements.
Current violent populism is likely to continue for another decade due to ongoing social changes. The question becomes how this period ends, with the answer being that it depends on conscious choices rather than historical inevitability. Understanding what's happening enables more intelligent decisions to offset negative directions.
The phenomenon of hypergamy creates a situation where the majority of young men cannot find suitable mates. Marriage and family formation traditionally reduce violent tendencies by channeling men into productive societal roles. Without this outlet, alternative solutions emerge. One historical approach involves sending young men to war. However, conscription today might lead these men to fight the system itself rather than comply.
Alternative solutions include colonizing North and South America to transform the Western Hemisphere into a US colony. Current actions with Venezuela suggest this direction, with potential moves toward Canada and Greenland also discussed.
The question arises whether America would realistically attempt to colonize Canada, Greenland, and Venezuela rather than pursuing soft power approaches. The argument suggests there's no one to stop such actions. Alberta's oil resources make it a particular target. Military capacity considerations factor into these calculations.
Extensive research involved watching over 200 of President Trump's speeches during his campaign and attending four rallies, requiring arrival three hours before start times due to crowds, with waits extending to ten hours. Survey work at these events revealed underlying support motivations. Comparative attendance at Harris rallies showed different dynamics, with easier access and seating availability.
The likelihood of territorial expansion depends significantly on the 2028 election outcome. Internal division makes external expansion less likely, while a strengthening MAGA red wave increases probability of such actions. Current conversations between President Trump and Canadian leadership about moving the border and abandoning the 1908 treaty represent direct diplomatic engagement rather than mere rhetoric.
War planning for Greenland exists, though this doesn't equate to conquest. Dismissing these developments as mere talk represents a mistake. The probability isn't assessed at 70% likelihood, but even a 20% probability changes strategic calculations fundamentally. Canadian leadership, including Carney's Munich speech, indicates awareness of potential developments on the horizon.
Taiwan presents a different probability assessment than US territorial expansion. If China continues growing economically, Taiwan may eventually fall into China's sphere without military action, as economic incentives draw Taiwanese citizens toward mainland opportunities. Historical engagement with Taiwanese leadership, including a 2003 conference with President Chen involving air power experts, revealed internal polls showing significant portions of the population favoring economic integration with China.
Immigration has generated tension from America's founding, with Scottish-Irish migrants facing profound marginalization. Business interests sought cheap labor while workers opposed it. These cycles of tension and adaptation represent normal patterns rather than unprecedented developments. The question becomes whether current divisions represent a break from historical cycles or continuation of established patterns.
The Iran conflict represents the biggest challenge since confronting Germany in World War II. Military modeling of bombing scenarios began in 2005 following Iran's uranium enrichment confirmation. The Ford facility bombing, which only American forces could execute due to precision ordinance requirements, would likely destroy 90% of centrifuge capability but leave uncertainty about 60% enriched uranium dispersal.
The escalation trap began with the Ford bombing rather than the February 28th leader assassination. The trap's stages were published days before the leader's killing. Current concerns involve the "nightmare scenario" of rising gas prices enabling Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, damaging Trump politically during midterms. This creates maximum leverage windows for Iran while potentially energizing Trump administration responses.
The 30-40 year arrangement where the United States provided security to Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Japan in exchange for treasury purchases faces destruction. The GCC's destruction through this conflict and Japan's resulting yen weakening threaten American debt refinancing capacity, representing potential economic catastrophe beyond short-term conflict concerns.
Significant splits exist within Iran, with recent speeches from major leaders acknowledging civilian suffering and calling for war termination. The Artesh (secular army) represents an alternative power structure. Previous uprisings killing approximately 20,000 people indicate ongoing divisions that predate the current conflict.
Since World War I, heavy economic pressure alone has never won a major war without accompanying military force. The British blockade on Germany in World War I killed over 700,000 German civilians but did not defeat Germany, requiring ground power to end the conflict. Economic sanctions on Japan before and during World War II did not prevent the need for atomic bombing of Japanese cities and Russian ground forces to secure victory. From 1990 to 2003, sanctions crushed the Iraqi economy by 50% each year, yet 150,000 American troops were ultimately required to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.
Iran is not a completely united country, contrary to external perceptions. There are significant factions and divisions within the country that existed before the war and remain present. External pressure can sometimes push these divisions together rather than break them apart, as seen during the Vietnam War. The regime itself is divided, with evidence of this division coming from a speech by a former head of the IRGC who stated that the conflict must not continue. This speech, published and transmitted worldwide, represented a significant internal disagreement within the regime.
Since World War I, there is no documented case where external pressure through economic sanctions or bombing alone has incited a popular revolt sufficient to topple a government without ground forces. The hope that air power or blockades could achieve this outcome has repeatedly failed. Wars do not end because of bombings alone, but through political processes that sometimes occur within countries.
Iran has adopted a strategy called the Mosak defense, featuring decentralized command and control military warfare. This means 31 commanders are spread throughout the country, and as long as one of them wants to continue fighting, the conflict persists regardless of what the people or central leadership want. The government operates through consensus rather than rigid top-down control, similar to the Taliban model in Afghanistan.
The MOU represented a major turning point in the conflict. Before the MOU, factions existed within Iran and a compromise was reached. However, when the Americans demonstrated they would not abide by the terms of the MOU, particularly regarding Iran's allies like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Iranians abandoned negotiation and compromise. This led to the Houthis being brought into the war, rapidly expanding the conflict.
The Ukraine war and Iran war are likely to merge, as evidenced by Zelensky bombing an Iranian cargo ship in the Caspian Sea. This could bring world powers including China and Russia into the conflict. January 2027 represents a focal point moment where the United States, China, and Iran will have an opportunity to reset their positions.
Iran has developed a strategy specifically targeting the US midterms, recognizing that oil inventories are running down and this represents their period of maximum pressure. Their objective is to destroy Trump's presidency politically, making him the lamest of lame ducks rather than removing him from office entirely. The first week in January will provide significant information about whether this strategy succeeds.
Israel refused to abide by major terms of the MOU, specifically the requirement that peace terms applying to Iran would also apply to Iran's allies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon. This would have required Israel to withdraw forces from southern Lebanon. Instead, Israel has accelerated attacks on Hezbollah and chosen to escalate the war. The Houthis, described as religious fanatics who are poor mountain people unafraid to die, have closed the Bab El Mandab Strait and are hitting Saudi Aramco facilities.
A new alliance structure is emerging in the Middle East involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia has no use for Iran, Turkey is seeking to evolve into a major power that scares Israel, and Pakistan is evolving dramatically in sophistication during this conflict. Today there was a story that Iran might be asked to join this coalition, which would represent a significant geopolitical development.
Israel is terrified of Turkey because the Turkish army is three times as large as the Israeli army, and Turkey represents the first enemy Israel cannot defeat due to both geography and military capability. Israeli society is built around a historical commitment to the belief that others will try to destroy them, creating a built-in paranoia. This represents an internal crisis for Israel, as its military capability may no longer be sufficient.
If Democrats control Congress following the midterms, two major developments are anticipated. First, there will be tremendous pressure to end the Iran war, similar to Congress's role in constraining the executive during Vietnam in 1974. Second, Democrats will want to constrain Israel, with a significant movement within the party to zero out budgets for Israel. This would force Israel to recalibrate its approach based on whether Democrats control Congress.
Even if Democrats control Congress and support ending the war, they face significant political risks. If stopping the war allows Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon, this could bring Republicans back to power in 2028. The fundamental difference in this conflict is that Trump's own party feels betrayed by his decision to engage in what they see as another forever war.
Iran appears to be implementing a strategy of waiting to see if American internal divisions cause the US position to collapse. Just as Iran has internal problems, the United States has enormous internal divisions. Iran may attempt to delay the conflict as long as possible and then try to make a deal in September or October before the election.
Legacy matters to the White House even beyond the president's personal concerns. With only 47 or 48 presidents in American history, legacy extends far beyond the next election and will persist for over 100 years after death. Even in their first term, presidents think about their legacy going forward.
The 1996 Clean Break Memo was a proposal to Benjamin Netanyahu arguing that Israel should withdraw from the Oslo peace accords to assure peace in the Middle East through strength. The memo advocated regime change in Iraq and Syria, economic and military self-sufficiency for Israel, and suggested that resolving the Palestinian issue required establishing peaceful strength rather than compromise. Every single point of this memo has been implemented. The people responsible for the memo, including Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, went on to work in the Bush administration and were architects of the Iraq war.
Following 9/11, Wesley Clark appeared with Amy Goodman and stated that the plan was to go after seven nations in five years: Iraq, Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia, and Iran. This suggests that attacking Iran was always part of a plan dating back to 1996 with the Clean Break Memo.
During the period when the Iraq war became a disaster, the Bush administration was warned about the consequences before the invasion occurred. The speaker had multiple interactions with the Bush administration after predicting that invading Iraq would trigger the largest suicide terrorist campaign of modern times. This prediction proved accurate, and the speaker's center at the University of Chicago, the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism, was started by the Bush administration itself. Paul Wolfowitz received this warning directly but proceeded with the invasion anyway.
The dangers of military action in Iran were widely understood at the time by both the military and by both Democratic and Republican White Houses. Iran represented a much bigger challenge than Iraq, described as the biggest challenge since Germany in World War II. This understanding was not unique to any particular administration.
President Trump has become his own national security adviser, secretary of defense, and secretary of state in his second term. All decisions flow from him directly, with others essentially executing his policies. The American system gives the president inordinate discretion when it comes to the use of force. The decision to bomb Iran was largely a personal bias and whim rather than following established advisory processes.
The speaker references Abraham Lincoln's famous story from Doris Kearns Goodwin's "Team of Rivals" where Lincoln went around the cabinet table, received unanimous opposition to his position, and declared "the ayes have it" anyway. This illustrates how presidents can make unilateral decisions regardless of advice from their cabinet.
Trump's actions form a consistent pattern: first canceling the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) under Obama, then transferring the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, recognizing Israel's control of the Golan Heights, and ordering the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. These actions positioned the bombing of Iran as a logical extension of his pro-Israel stance.
The Greater Israel Project refers to the idea that Israel should occupy all biblical lands promised to Abraham, extending from the Nile in Egypt to the Euphrates in Iraq. This framework explains the pattern of US military actions over the past 20 years against Iraq, Libya, Syria, and now Iran, which threatens to engulf Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan.
Trump is described as enthralled with the use of violence and part of violent populism. While he kept his promise not to start a war in his first term, the process leading up to January 6th radicalized MAGA, making political violence more acceptable. This normalization of political violence at home makes it easier to use internationally. Trump did not start wars in his first term but has become more comfortable with force domestically and internationally across his two presidencies.
Trump harbors a rational fear of a nuclear 9/11 scenario involving Iran. The concern centers on what would happen if a ship sailed into New York Harbor with a nuclear weapon rather than aircraft being used as in 2001. Given Iran's ideology, nuclear materials, and relationship with al-Qaeda, this fear drives his fundamental demand regarding nuclear weapons. However, his actions—withdrawing from JCPOA, assassinating Soleimani, and attacking Iran—proceeded irrationally despite the rational concern.
The JCPOA was working to prevent nuclear development, yet Trump withdrew from it seeking more direct American control rather than relying on international agreements. He replaced it with a maximum pressure campaign, which failed to stop Iran's nuclear program. The speaker notes that learning from this failure should have led to different approaches, but instead resulted in more pressure rather than recognizing that pressure campaigns were making things worse.
Trump overestimates American power and went into the war expecting it to be readily accomplished. He did not understand the mosaic system of regional dynamics and did not account for potential responses. While pressure can be a legitimate measure, Trump lacks understanding of how to apply it effectively or recognize the limits of American power.
Israel's grand strategic problem is being 7 million Jews surrounded by 300-400 million Muslims. The Greater Israel Project can only succeed with American power backing it. If America withdraws completely from the Middle East, Israel faces existential challenges. The Iran war serves as a potential solution to remove the US military from the equation through an escalation trap that would force American withdrawal back to the Western Hemisphere.
Israel has always faced enemies it could defeat, but the emerging alliance with Turkey makes Israel too weak to manage current threats. Netanyahu has made massive mistakes in overestimating his influence and power. Israel is losing the American public, and the fundamental crisis requires accommodation rather than force, which Netanyahu refuses to consider.
Israel's influence over US policy stems from money through AIPAC and the Israel lobby, as detailed in John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt's book. Jews as a group give more money to elections than any other group per capita, with approximately a third of all election money coming from Jewish donors. Additionally, an alliance exists between Zionist capital and Christian evangelicals, particularly Christian Zionists who believe Israel is part of God's plan. CUFI (Christians United for Israel) has about 7 million members focused exclusively on Israel.
During the Cold War, the strategic relationship made more sense when the Soviets had relations with Syria and Egypt, and Israel was one of few pro-American countries in the region. The 1973 Arab attack on Israel used Soviet weapons and tactics. However, these Cold War dynamics are now obsolete, yet the alliance structure remains.
Jewish representatives and Christian Zionists running for Congress are losing support. A movement on the right, including supporters of Tucker Carlson and candidates like Joe Kent, is unhappy with Israel's role in driving foreign wars. These voters are replacing incumbents with candidates who would zero out funding for Israel. The alliance between Zionist capital and Christian evangelicals has unprecedented access to capital, as demonstrated by spending $30 million to defeat Thomas Massie in Kentucky and $70 million to defeat another candidate in Michigan.
The primary use of Israel as a strategic asset for the United States is obsolete. Syria does not have Russian bases, and Egypt is no longer a Soviet power potentially blocking the Suez Canal. Israel was once a vital asset for the United States under Cold War circumstances, but many countries now have far more money than Israel. The relationship between the US and Israel is not based on money but was formed when the Soviets were so powerful there.
The anger against Israel stems from this being the war that's hurting the American pocketbook in a serious way. Since 1991, GDP growth patterns show that the US economy did not decline during the Gulf War in 1991, Kosovo, the 2003 Iraq invasion, or the forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This war is different because Americans are feeling it in their pocketbook for real.
Thomas Massie is one of the most ardent anti-Israel voices in Congress. Trump went after Massie in a big way, targeting both Massie and Marjorie Taylor Greene. When targeted by Trump, this means assassination attempts against you, your kids, and your families. This isn't just small political targeting.
Money has a significant impact on American politics, and Zionists have substantial money to spend. Trump's influence within the Republican Party is very powerful, so if he targets you, whether Thomas Massie or Marjorie Taylor Greene, you will lose. However, Trump's influence is waning and up for grabs between now and January.
Trump's desire to hold on to power is what's driving the escalation trap between now and January. While institutionalization and money create an uphill battle, this can crumble within a couple of years. By 2028, there will likely be a Democratic presidential candidate who will be avowedly anti-Zionist, not just on the edges, and this is what they'll almost run on.
Somebody will be blamed for the wreckage of the Iran war. Trump will already be toast by that point because the wreckage is going to continue for a while. The Iran war is the biggest mess in modern history, the biggest mess since World War I, the biggest mess in 100 years. The economic consequences are massive, not casualties.
If the war doesn't end, it will be the biggest crisis. If it ends, it'll become like other past wars. The fundamental question is how does it end. The nature of political systems in Russia or Iran and how they continue wars isn't fully understood. So far, this has not created the kind of crisis in the United States that Vietnam did. If it goes on for another year, it would be the biggest crisis.
The consequences of the war continuing depend on what happens in the Straits of Hormuz. If they were secured and the war went on, it might have one path. Trump's effort to end the war quickly with a victory is likely to create a Pyrrhic victory that goes on and on. Iran is evolving in ways that are uncertain.
Between now and November, which is 75 days, there is a low probability of expecting Iran to implode. Iran is using the election to try to force Trump into a position where he has to end it even by making massive concessions. The likelihood of Trump voluntarily ending it is 0%. Trump is more likely to use force, starting with economic force, to get a symbolic victory, but Iran is not willing to give him the victory he wants.
Iran is sophisticated and using the election as a bargaining chip. They are trying to push the war out past October, when the president cannot make a deal. They are succeeding because Trump understands he's going to lose power if he continues this. The question is whether Trump cares more about remaining powerful as president or about beating the Iranians because he started the war and wanted to be successful.
If Trump wants to win this war and bring world peace and prosperity, he needs to do two things. First, give $2 trillion to Iran. The United States is $40 trillion in debt, so $2 trillion to Iran is not a big deal. Second, control Israel, embargo Israel, and state that if they misbehave, the US will cut off arms and no longer support them. Israel must withdraw from Lebanon, stop the seven wars they're fighting, and come to peace with the Palestinians. If Trump does these two things, he will be remembered as the greatest president in US history.
Containing Israel is becoming more part of President Trump's repertoire, though not as much as it should be. The key problem is that Trump is trying to end this conflict between now and the midterms. If he were to give $2 trillion, Iran would say they also want the US to pull all forces out. Then Iran would likely topple governments in the Gulf States because there's no oversight. Because there's a power vacuum, Iran would fill it and wreck Trump's future.
The $2 trillion isn't about gold but US currency, which is going to be worthless anyway. The point is that Iran needs to participate in the global economy and ensure the Middle East can send oil to East Asia. This is a version of JD Vance's idea of pay for performance, but Iran is not doing a business deal. What Iran wants is power, which is what's at issue in international politics.
Twenty years ago, neoliberalism in Washington held that trade would promote peace. If you wanted peace in the Middle East, you would trade with Iran, let them sell their oil, and then have peace. This idea is flawed because it requires a big protector like the United States to enforce the stability on which that deal rested.
In 1991, when America won a stunning victory in the Middle East, there was confidence that America could police sea lanes globally, not just in the Middle East. This is why trade went from 38% of world product to 62% of world product. Now instability is back, making trade more expensive and riskier with higher insurance rates, resulting in less trade overall.
NATO is already dead in terms of its key element. NATO at its core is a unified warfighting alliance where Article 5 means a US general commands all NATO troops, including British, German, and others. France is not in NATO for this reason. The Americans call the shots for everybody in NATO.
Trump really hates the Europeans more than he hates the Iranians. He blames the Europeans for his 2020 election loss and thinks Obama conspired with Europeans to defeat him. This is why he went after NATO.
In 1990, the UK was around 6-12% of world GDP. Today it's just under 4%. America was 26% of world GDP in 1990 and remains flat at 26% today. China was 2% in 1990 and is now at 17%. Europeans are down by a third or more. Japan was over 10% of world GDP in 1990 and is now at 4%. The United States has been enormously privileged by the Cold War period ending at the expense of other countries.
Japan responded to American pullback by massively increasing its military power and did not simply ask where the United States was going. China now worries greatly about Japan. The Europeans thought it was immoral to want to pull back and depend on themselves. The American point of view was that the EU is larger than China economically, so there was no reason why the US should be the primary defender of Europe.
The questioning of whether the US should remain exposed in NATO would have been put on the table by any president at this point, not just Trump. The China example is what Europe should have done. Japan is creating a much greater force along with Australia and Vietnam. There are limits to what can be blamed on Trump.
Global population is going to peak around 2100, then decline to maybe 10 billion. This decline is happening not just in the United States but in Europe as well. The question is how much of a curveball changing demographics will be when planning geopolitically, especially with AI, robotics, and automation coming simultaneously.
The earth can only support about 2 billion people by itself. The way this is managed is with fertilizer. The Middle East provides a quarter to a third of the world's fertilizer. If a quarter to a third of the world's fertilizer goes offline for a year, millions of people will starve to death. There is no way the world will reach 9 billion people, with massive starvation throughout Africa at some point.
From 1991 until this war, America was preeminent. Now America is being knocked back because for the first time since 1991, a state has beaten America. Everybody is learning that America can be beaten. America's global influence, called American hegemony, is now fading fast. What's going to replace it may be more fragmented than multipolarity, potentially an emerging anarchy.
China is not the Soviet Union and doesn't occupy countries. China uses economic influence through investment in those countries. This is very different from the United States, which operates with more military power. In this emerging anarchy, there will be greater incentives for nuclear proliferation, as seen with Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Poland is the eastern front of Europe and cannot trust the western front because it's an alliance of the willing. Poland is evolving dramatically and has the capability and is discussing becoming a nuclear power. Poland has 10,000 US troops but is not counting on the United States.
The economic alliance between the United States and China will create a strange pole because they have very similar interests. The world is moving to a more war-prone condition. North Korea is the big one to watch for new conflicts. North Korea is poor but has nuclear weapons, and if Japan, China, and South Korea are all distracted, North Korea could extort everyone.
The global quasi-anarchist world is happening because from 1991 when the Cold War ended, stability was followed by the first Gulf War showing America could easily beat Iraq. Now people know that America can't look after everybody anymore. The United States doesn't want that role, so it's not only that they can't do it, but they don't want to do it. There's no longer anybody in charge.
In 2000, the world was perfect. Then decisions were made to invade Iraq, Libya, Syria and create chaos in the Middle East. Then sanctions on Russia, NATO expansion westwards, and conflict in Ukraine between Russia and Ukraine. The root cause is hubris.
The United States is becoming exhausted and doesn't want its power, but hubris is also playing a role. This makes the Iran war even more problematic as it expedited something that was already modeled for years. The speaker modeled this specific scenario for 20 years, identifying it as the biggest problem the United States would face since Germany in World War II.
If the conflict extends, it will become a major issue, but participants agree not to overestimate its current scope. However, if given 18 months to 2.5 years, the consequences would be significant. The situation is compared to being on a gangplank with water on either side - the difference between life and death depends on how far one proceeds.
The real issue involves President Trump walling himself off from strong advisors, with an extremely weak group of advisors surrounding him. Natalie Harp is mentioned among the advisors.
Vietnam was far worse from the American point of view, but from a global perspective it was not as terrible. After Vietnam, America could shift to deal with Europe and defend against the Soviet Union. With this war, there's no such shifting option. If history determines that one person decided to press the button one morning, questions will arise about how power became so centralized behind one person.
The 2016 Hillary Clinton commercial about the red phone ringing at 3:00 a.m. is referenced as illustrating the constitutional structure where one person makes nuclear decisions.
The forces making Iran consider its options shouldn't be underestimated. If the war continues, it would have massive effects and has already had significant impacts. However, it's premature to assume complete understanding of how far Iran can go. One man started the war and failed to win it, but the conflict may not necessarily continue indefinitely.
January represents an inflection point because either President Trump will have the wherewithal to continue the war or won't, depending on whether Democrats win Congress and act to shut it down.
Damage has already been done to energy facilities that will take six months to restart, even if the war ends immediately. This represents a fundamental shift in the nature of life on Earth, though recovery is possible in the shorter run.
The threshold of concern includes the debt crisis and world economy. Even if a world recession or depression occurs, recovery is possible. However, confidence in America as the protector of the global system won't return for decades.
There's a desire in the United States, particularly among Texas Republicans, not to have responsibility for the world. During the Cold War, serving to fill the gap was natural, but neighbors reject the idea that America is responsible for the world. Trump's involvement in the conflict contradicts his promises not to get America involved again.
If American primacy is ending, the future of Social Security becomes uncertain. There's already inadequate care for people in their 90s, with more elderly expected. The connection between the war and Social Security involves American production and trade being critical to the world, with debt and financial underpinnings being stressed.
Artificial intelligence accounts for 50% of GDP growth in the United States through AI data centers financed by the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council). If the war continues and GCC financing stops, the AI bubble could burst, resulting in millions of unemployed Americans.
The United States could dominate the Western Hemisphere without paying defense costs and may get by in a different system. All participants agree a radical new system is emerging, though opinions differ on whether this evolution is catastrophic from American or global perspectives.
Nuclear war will not happen because there's no incentive for nations to blow themselves up. Mutual assured destruction explains why such wars haven't occurred. No scenario is seen where nuclear weapons are used, even tactically.
Before the war started on February 28th, the odds of nuclear weapon use by the United States were modeled at under 5%, with Israel at about 15%. These percentages have been doubling over time due to the nature of the players and actions increasing Iran's incentives to conduct nuclear tests.
Iran cannot develop nuclear weapons due to a fatwa that would require the supreme leader to organize a council to rescind. This could be arranged quickly, and Iran is considering withdrawing from the NPT. Iran would only develop nuclear weapons if Israel or the United States attacked first.
Building deliverable nuclear weapons is more complex than testing, though atomic weapons like Fat Man and Little Boy were delivered on aircraft. North Korea, the 212th poorest country, conducted 60 nuclear tests, suggesting Iran could solve this problem over time.
If Iran tests two nuclear devices as an October surprise, the response would need to be immediate rather than waiting years for weaponization. The first test would probably fail, but time is the critical factor.
The primary inflection point is whether Democrats win one or both houses of Congress in November 2026 and are seated peacefully on January 3rd. This follows the precedent of November 2020 when the election didn't go Trump's way. If the 2026 election goes against Trump and he disturbs the seating process, all issues would worsen significantly.
A positive development would be a US-China economic detente reducing tensions. If these two countries collaborate, the global system could stabilize in a different form.
If the United States targets Iranian power plants or desalination plants, the war becomes uncontrollable. Iran would target all Middle East energy infrastructure including pipelines and energy fields using drones, even without boots on the ground or nuclear weapons.
Targeting electric power plants was studied extensively in the 1990s by the US Air Force. Thomas Griffith's paper on targeting electric power remains the authoritative work on consequences, warning that this approach hasn't been used for 20 years due to its devastating effects.
Taking out electric power in Tehran for a month would cause starvation since 25% of food is under refrigeration, including all supermarkets. Water pumping stations would fail in the Middle East where water depends on electricity. This would result in droughts, starvation, and mass evacuations of 10 million people with nowhere to go.
Targeting electric power is worse than using tactical nukes in terms of escalation and civilian death. The American Air Force has two aim points on electric power: cables connecting plants to the grid (causing 4-5 day outages) versus actual generating halls (requiring 6 months to replace due to their massive size).
President Trump's rhetoric about massive consequences fits with targeting the generating halls. Once Tehran loses power, 70% of Iran's population would eventually be without electricity as additional nodes are targeted.
Resources mentioned include YouTube and Substack Predictive History, Substack Escalation Trap by Professor Pape, a new YouTube channel Pape on the Politics of Force, and the book Our Worst Enemies: America in the Age of Violent Populism. Geopolitical futures can be found at geopoliticalfutures.com.
The assessment concludes that humanity will survive, though the situation appears extremely improbable.
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