Sarah Paine — Why wars are so difficult to end
In a Nutshell
Japan won the Russo-Japanese War by achieving limited objectives—removing Russia from Korea and southern Manchuria—before reaching its culminating point of victory, using pre-planned mediation through Theodore Roosevelt to exit while Russia still had massive troop advantages. Limited wars succeed when the political goal remains achievable without triggering third-party intervention or putting the enemy on death ground, whereas unlimited objectives like regime change create determined resistance and often escalate regional conflicts into broader wars. The key pathology is conventional victory followed by insurgency, as seen when occupying forces face unified populations fighting for existential stakes on home territory.
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It is easy to get into wars but difficult to get out of them, and even more difficult to exit having achieved the desired objectives. The Russo-Japanese War serves as a model example of successful war termination from the Japanese perspective.
Russia held significant advantages over Japan in territory, population, industrial base, resource endowment, army size, and navy size. The key question becomes how Japan achieved victory despite these disadvantages.
The presentation will cover: the Russo-Japanese War as a model, termination of other regional wars, and two pathologies - regional wars escalating into global wars and conventional defeat followed by insurgency as a victory denial strategy.
Key concepts from Carl von Clausewitz include the culminating point of attack, culminating point of victory, the image of a blown glass flask, decisive battle or war-winning battle, and limited versus unlimited objectives. From Sun Tzu comes the concept of death ground.
Manchuria was Chinese territory. Both Japan and Russia sought to expand their empires - Japan into the Korean Peninsula and Russia into Manchuria. Russia had built an extensive railway system from Harbin south to Port Arthur, which served as an ice-free naval base unlike Vladivostok.
During the Boxer Rebellion, the Boxers tore up railway concessions in Manchuria. Russia sent troops to prevent this damage but failed to withdraw after the rebellion ended. Japan attempted to negotiate spheres of influence, offering recognition of Russian interests in Manchuria in exchange for Japanese interests in Korea, but Russia showed no interest.
Japan decided to resolve the situation militarily by attacking Port Arthur to neutralize the Russian naval base. Without control of Port Arthur, Japan could not protect its sea lines of communication for supplies and troops between Japan and the mainland.
Japan possessed only four armies, with one quarter committed to investing Port Arthur by land. The Japanese strategy involved advancing up the railway system toward Harbin, fighting a series of battles culminating in an annihilating battle that would force Russia to the bargaining table.
General Nogi faced tremendous pressure to reduce the Port Arthur fortress through frontal attacks, which resulted in heavy casualties. After four such attacks, Nogi realized that capturing 203 Meter Hill was essential to eliminate the Russian fleet, as spotters positioned there could direct large-caliber siege guns to hit ships anchored in the harbor.
While the siege continued, Russia sent its Baltic Fleet to relieve Port Arthur. The fleet divided its assets, with larger vessels going around Africa and smaller ones through the Suez Canal. This deployment proved costly and difficult for Russia.
Both sides fought for limited objectives rather than regime change. Japan never intended to overthrow the Russian government in St. Petersburg, and Nicholas II quickly abandoned his initial plan to invade Japan. Japan's objective was to remove Russian presence from Korea and Manchuria.
Success in war is measured by achieving the objectives for which the war is fought, not by winning all battles. The United States won most conventional battles in Vietnam but did not achieve its objectives. Japan achieved its goal of removing Russians from Korea and gained additional concessions including the southern half of Russian railway concessions in Manchuria and the naval base.
Russia's expenditure on the war meant it could not invest in expanding its railway system in European Russia, which would have been valuable for fighting World War I. Nicholas II later lost that war, leading to the execution of him and his family in a Siberian basement.
According to Clausewitz, most attacks lead only to the point where remaining strength is sufficient to maintain defense and wait for peace. Beyond this culminating point of attack, the scale turns and reaction follows with greater force than the original attack. The culminating point of victory applies to the entire war rather than individual battles.
A key indicator that a side has exceeded its culminating point of victory is third-party intervention that may change the nature of the war, particularly if the third party is significant.
The Battle of Port Arthur lasted nearly a year and resulted in Japan destroying Russia's fleet in the theater. General Nogi lost approximately 45,000 men through frontal attacks - equivalent to the size of one Japanese army.
After capturing 203 Meter Hill, it took another week to position the siege guns. Within three days, the Japanese sank all Russian ships in the harbor. The Russians capitulated after approximately one month, despite having sufficient food supplies and 3,000 horses that could have sustained them longer.
The Russian war plans failed to consider using Port Arthur as a fortress in being that tied up substantial Japanese assets. The Russians could have leveraged this advantage more effectively.
Arguments can be made for different culminating points of attack: either the capture of 203 Meter Hill, which eliminated sanctuary for the Russian fleet, or the actual destruction of the fleet itself, which was the operational goal that freed Japanese army and navy assets.
Clausewitz noted that campaigns whose outcome has been determined by a single battle have become fairly common only in recent times, but cases where a single battle settles an entire war are very rare. A decisive battle means a war-winning battle rather than simply an important battle.
Different terms should be used for different battle characteristics: lopsided for battles with heavily skewed casualty rates, pivotal for battles that foreclose certain options for one side while opening opportunities for the other.
The question is whether the war ended before, after, or exactly at Japan's culminating point of victory. Five alternative explanations exist for identifying this point.
Russia was politically backward with an increasingly urbanized and educated population that had no political representation. The 1905 Revolution saw peaceful demonstrators heading toward the Winter Palace to petition the Tsar, but troops opened fire when the Tsar was absent, damaging government legitimacy and leading Nicholas II to establish a weak legislature.
Clausewitz used the image of a Bologn flask - strong enough to use as a hammer but capable of shattering from an internal scratch - to describe how war termination depends on whether the first shock of battle stiffens enemy resolve or shatters their will to fight.
Since Nicholas II was an autocrat whose personal decisions determined Russia's course, his loss of resolve effectively ended the war. This represents one explanation for the culminating point of victory.
The Japanese committed every available person to the Battle of Mukden, including those too young, too old, or too tired to fight effectively. Despite this, Japan could muster 125,000 fewer troops than Russia. The Trans-Siberian Railway's carrying capacity increased from 20,000-40,000 troops per month at the war's beginning to 100,000 by Mukden.
At the war's beginning, Russia had fewer than 100,000 men in the Asian theater. By August at the Battle of Liaoyang, Russia had nearly 150,000 troops - 20,000 more than the Japanese. By August 1905, Russia had nearly 800,000 troops in theater, representing 40% of its total army of 3 million troops.
Even before attacking Port Arthur, Japan had planned its exit strategy through President Theodore Roosevelt as mediator. The Japanese calculated that Americans would serve as busybodies in the conflict, which proved correct.
Prime Minister Ito decided to use Viscount Kaneko, a Harvard graduate and acquaintance of Roosevelt, to contact the President about mediating. Negotiations would be conducted by Baron Komura, another Harvard alumnus. This diplomatic infrastructure was established in advance.
At Mukden, Field Marshal Yamagata recognized he was out of options and called in the American card. His assessment was that the enemy would never request peace unless Japan invaded Moscow or St. Petersburg, which was not feasible. The enemy still possessed powerful forces at home while Japan had exhausted its resources and could not replace lost officers.
Both Japan and Russia depended on loans to finance the war. Japan's battlefield successes lowered its interest rates, making borrowing cheaper, while Russia faced financial difficulties after a prior recession and bad harvest. After Mukden, no one would finance Russian loans because Russia was considered a poor investment.
Russia did not need to fight the Battle of Tsushima since supplies came via the Trans-Siberian Railway, not by sea. Nicholas II chose to engage on Japanese terms, resulting in the loss of the entire Russian fleet. Japan lost only three torpedo boats while commandeering numerous Russian ships, actually increasing its fleet size.
President Roosevelt suggested Japan capture Sakhalin Island at the war's end, as Russia could do nothing to prevent it. This territory could then be traded back at peace negotiations. For Russia, losing its own territory to an Asian country represented a significant loss of prestige that may have shattered Nicholas II's resolve.
Countries that fight indefinitely often face unlimited objectives when placed on death ground. Nicholas II's Bologn flask definitely shattered, and a decade later he would die in a Siberian basement for losing World War I.
The Russo-Japanese War is presented as a model case of war termination. Japan achieved its core war objectives: removing Russia from Manchuria, securing Korea without doubt, and gaining a sphere of influence in southern Manchuria, which is the size of Germany and France combined. Japan also acquired the southern half of Sakhalin Island through negotiation and confirmed its status as the dominant regional power in Asia following its victory over China in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.
The 1991 Gulf War represents an even more successful model where the United States achieved its objectives at minimal cost. National Security Directive 54 clearly stated the limited objectives: forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, restoring the Kuwaiti government, and protecting American lives. The United States secured over 200,000 coalition troops from 34 allies, received over $50 billion to cover US costs plus an additional $14 billion for coalition partners, and suffered only 258 American deaths out of 392 total coalition casualties. Iraq lost between 20,000 and 35,000 military deaths with up to 3,000 civilian casualties from bombing.
The Korean War is analyzed through geographic constraints that made it difficult to isolate the theater. The land border between North and South Korea is only 250 kilometers, but the northern border with China spans approximately 1,400 kilometers. Manchuria was China's industrial base, ensuring uninterrupted supply lines. The Korean railway system ran along the shoreline, making it vulnerable to naval blockade and shore artillery, but the massive northern border with China prevented complete isolation.
Clausewitz's framework is presented as the primary discriminator for understanding war types. The political objective is always primary over the military objective. There are fundamentally two types of wars: unlimited wars aim at regime change to render the enemy politically helpless or militarily impotent, while limited wars seek to occupy frontier districts for annexation or bargaining purposes. The degree of force used depends on the scale of the political objective, and the political object determines both the military objective and the required effort.
Sun Tzu's concept of death ground explains why unlimited wars are difficult to execute. Death ground is where an army survives only by fighting with courage of desperation. When facing regime change, the defeated regime is slated for annihilation, and soldiers fight to the death when they have no alternative. This concept is illustrated by Ukraine's resistance, where the population fights with determination because they face existential threat.
Unlimited policy objectives conclude with regime change where the defeated has no choices, though the United States kept Emperor Hirohito for his utility in implementing political reforms. Limited wars mean the defeated government remains and must be negotiated with, potentially causing future problems. Limited wars are conceptually difficult due to debates over optimal objectives but are easier to execute, while unlimited wars are conceptually simple but difficult to execute because they put people on death ground.
The Korean War exceeded culminating points of victory twice. Kim Il-sung's invasion of the South triggered third-party intervention by the United States and UN partners, transforming a civil war into a regional war with global war potential. MacArthur's Inchon landing succeeded militarily but exceeded the culminating point when advancing too close to the Chinese border, triggering Chinese intervention with hundreds of thousands of troops and resulting in MacArthur's dismissal.
The first pathology involves regional wars escalating into global wars. The American Revolution began as a limited war from the colonists' perspective but became unlimited from London's view, putting colonists on death ground. Britain's many rivals had time to intervene, with France allying in 1778, Spain in 1779, and the Netherlands attacked in 1780, transforming a regional conflict into global warfare across multiple theaters including Savannah, Louisiana, Gibraltar, Minorca, Cape Verde Islands, India, and the Caribbean sugar islands.
World War I demonstrates how alliance systems fail when objectives don't align. Britain wanted the status quo while France sought Alsace-Lorraine, Italy wanted Eastern Mediterranean territories, Russia desired the Balkans and Austria-Hungary's removal from Serbia, Austria-Hungary sought more Balkans territory, the Ottomans wanted Balkan gains, and Germany sought colonies. Primary theaters didn't align, creating parallel wars, and no settlement could satisfy all alliance members, preventing any party from ditching allies.
Japan's regional war in Asia escalated due to the Smoot-Hawley tariff during the Great Depression, which raised US tariffs dramatically. Japan's trade-dependent economy faced retaliation from trading partners, leading to the invasion of Manchuria for autarky. When Japan extended operations to all of China, Chinese factions united against the existential threat, fighting Japan to a stalemate. Japan's attempt to cut off foreign aid to Chinese nationalists led to attacks on multiple locations including Malaya, Philippines, Singapore, Wake Island, Guam, Thailand, and Shanghai, bringing the United States, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand into the conflict.
Regional wars that escalate share characteristics: large theaters that are difficult to close off, protracted conflicts allowing third-party intervention time, enemies with friends who provide support, unlimited objectives creating determined resistance, and accumulating losses reducing willingness to compromise.
The second pathology involves conventional victory followed by lethal insurgency that prevents stabilization. Japan faced this in China where nationalists and communists used both conventional forces and guerrilla warfare. Concentrating forces against conventional armies left rear areas vulnerable to guerrillas, while dispersing forces to counter guerrillas allowed conventional forces freedom of action. This represents a cost imposition strategy.
The value of the object concept measures the political objective's worth to each side. George Washington understood that Americans living in the theater had higher value of the object than British interveners. This tends to be true when fighting on home territory versus intervening from afar. The strategy involves ratcheting up costs until the outsider leaves, as seen in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
The 2003 Iraq War pursued unlimited objectives through regime change, which proved easy, but created a mosaic society problem. Iraq's primary identities are ethnic rather than national, with different groups potentially hostile to each other. Building state institutions becomes nearly impossible when groups are fighting over national identities rather than state institutions, unlike Korea where national identity was unified. The border challenge increased from 158 miles in the 1991 Gulf War to over 2,000 miles, with three neighbors having regional ambitions: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey will be involved whether you like it or not. It often doesn't take that much involvement to really set things off. Sometimes a car bomb will do it. This is a sacred Shia shrine, car bomb or whatever, blow it up. It set off a big sectarian war. It's very very difficult to stabilize these places.
Useful questions to ask before certainly before you get into a war, but even ongoing ones is take a look at who's involved, who's interested, and then this is where I would get into my big matrix for me is who's got limited versus unlimited objectives. And visa v whom right is it limited against several neighbors or all neighbors or one is for instance Russia has an unlimited objective visa v Ukraine but Ukraine has a limited objective for visav Russia and what what does all this yield? What is the alignment of policy objectives among all these different countries? What how do primary adversaries align by all these different parties? Relative values of the object, for whom is it existential, for whom is it nice to have?
I would wager that what happens in Ukraine is of much more interest to Ukrainians than it is to Russians. Right now, Russians have suffered really large losses. So, that is of interest, but for Ukrainians, it would be more so because that's where they live.
Also, you want to look at geographic access, right? I pointed this out with map of Iraq and also sanctuary. Are certain places invulnerable to attack? So you don't have much leverage over them. But anyway, and is there any asymmetries of this? What lines up? It'll give you a sense of who can actually align with whom and who can't.
So that is what I had prepared for you this evening. And thank you for bearing me out.
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